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Over the last twenty years, independent political groups have
increased their attempts to sway national opinion and influence
elections.' These independent groups (IGs) are not directly associated
with a candidate or a political party, but generally either seek to promote
issues associated with candidates running for office, or seek to influence
an election in favor of or in opposition to a specific candidate. During
the 2004 election cycle, many of these groups became household names.
Moveon.org, Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and countless other IGs were
extremely active in trying to sway the electorate during the 2004
election. Section 527 political organizations, which are IGs that have as
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1. The history of our nation is full of independent groups seeking to influence
society and its laws. The National American Woman Suffrage Association fought
for women's voting rights, the National Women's Party fought for the Nineteenth
Amendment, and the NAACP has been active in promoting civil rights. What is
different now is the magnitude and the scope of independent political groups. The
Independent Groups (IGs) that are the subject of this article are not just interested in
promoting issues and causes, but also seek to influence directly the election of
candidates. See Edward B. Foley, The 'Major Purpose' Test: Distinguishing
Between Election-Focused and Issue-Focused Groups, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 341, 342
(2004) (contending that independent political committees by definition seek to
directly influence elections and other independent groups that do not have
influencing elections as their major purpose nonetheless may seek to influence a
federal election to achieve their primary ideological purpose).
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their primary purpose influencing elections, spent over $600 million
during the 2004 election cycle.2 This Article examines whether certain
taxable entities will become the new "loophole" used by IGs to avoid
campaign finance regulations. The Article concludes that in most cases
taxable entities will not be an attractive campaign vehicle because there
will be significant tax implications if an entity forgoes tax-exempt status.
IGs are currently exploring alternative entity structures because
Congress has indicated that it may further regulate these organizations
based on their entity status. These attempts to regulate the activities and
spending of IGs are often in tension with First Amendment principles
and jurisprudence. As Congress attempts to further regulate the
campaign activities of IGs, many of these groups seek to organize their
• 3
affairs in a way that allows them to escape this regulation. Their
methods of doing so and the consequences of their actions have been
written about for some time.4  As part of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA), Congress recently stepped up its efforts to tighten
campaign finance laws and attempted to place restrictions on groups
engaged in independent political advocacy. 5  However, the Supreme
Court, in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life
6(WRTL), significantly rolled back some of the restrictions placed on
corporations and labor unions (two types of IGs) that were enacted as
2. OpenSecrets.org provides receipts and expenditures of 527 organizations by
election cycle. See OpenSecrets.org, Advocacy Group Spending, www.opensecrets.
org/527s/; see also Jeffrey M. Berry & Clyde Wilcox, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY
(4th ed. 2007).
3. The Federal Election Commission is charged with regulating entities subject
to the nation's election laws. The Service is charged with enforcing election related
provisions contained in the Internal Revenue Code.
4. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1705, 1715-16 (1999) (discussing
campaign finance regulation and arguing that reforms may be counter-productive
because money will trickle down a less desirable path); Gerard J. Clark & Steven B.
Lichtman, The Finger in the Dike: Campaign Finance Regulation After McConnell,
39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 629, 662-67 (2006) (noting that political actors adjusted to
campaign finance reforms through the use of certain independent political groups);
David S. Broder, Op-Ed., What McCain-Feingold Didn't Fix, WASH. POST, May 20,
2004, at A29 (arguing that the current campaign finance regulatory scheme is being
circumvented by independent groups).
5. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2002).
6. 127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007).
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part of the BCRA. The Court upheld an as-applied challenge brought by
Wisconsin Right to Life and found that some of the restrictions in BCRA
violated the First Amendment when applied to certain communications
by corporations and labor unions. The decision basically rendered the
challenged provisions useless with regard to much of the election-related
communication by corporations and unions.
Even prior to this decision, Congress was considering additional
and different ways of regulating the campaign activities of IGs, and the
WRTL decision may encourage Congress to seek alternative means of
regulating the campaign activities of corporations and unions. For
example, Congress amended § 527 of the Code to require political
organizations to disclose contributions and expenditures as a condition of
the organization receiving tax-exempt status. One of the reasons that
Congress chose this regulatory approach, as opposed to simply requiring
political organizations to disclose, is that Congress believed that the
statute had a better chance of withstanding constitutional challenge if it
were designed as a condition on receiving the benefit of tax-exempt
status.7 Similarly, Congress could seek to regulate the communication of
corporations and labor unions by requiring shareholders or union
members to approve election-related communication. The WRTL
decision only increases the chances that Congress will seek new and
innovative ways to regulate the communication of IGs. As Congress
seeks out new ways to regulate IGs, IGs will seek out new and
innovative ways to engage in political advocacy with as little government
regulation as possible. To the extent that Congress bases its new
regulations on the entity structure of an organization, IGs will
increasingly look for entity structures that are not subject to regulation.
7. See, 146 CONG. REC. S5994-03, 2000 WL 859709 (June 28, 2000) ("The
constitutionality of this bill would be clear for an entirely different reason. And that
is that this bill does not prohibit anyone from speaking, nor does it force any group
that does not currently have to comply with FECA or disclose information about
itself to do either of those things. Instead, the bill speaks only to what a group must
do if it wants the public subsidy of tax exemption-something the Supreme Court
has made clear no one has a constitutional right to have."); Gregg Polsky & Guy-
Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1000, 1004 (2005) (discussing constitutional question and examining the legislative
history surrounding § 527's disclosure provisions).
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IGs, like other organizations, need some type of organizational
structure to carry on their activities. In general, IGs organize as
corporations or unincorporated associations and then obtain tax-exempt
status for the organization. Businesses have long considered
organizational form when choosing how to conduct business; therefore, it
is no surprise that IGs will seek to do so as well. The major difference is
that businesses generally seek organizational forms that will help them
maximize profits, while IGs seek forms that allow them to maximize
their political advocacy. In determining how to organize the entity, IGs
are faced with two different organizational form choices. The first is
how to organize the entity under state law. They must determine
whether they want to organize as a corporation, partnership, limited
liability company, or unincorporated association. The second is whether
they want to claim tax-exempt status, and if they do, under what
provision of the Internal Revenue Code.
Each of the above decisions has potentially serious implications
for the operation of the IG. Because corporations are subject to
significant restrictions under campaign-finance laws, the decision to
organize as a corpdration may significantly restrict an organization's
ability to engage in political advocacy. 8 Furthermore, since the Internal
8. Corporations are prohibited from making contributions in connection with
an election for any Federal office, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2002); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b)(1)
(2005), from making any expenditures with respect to a federal election, 2 U.S.C. §
441b (2002); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b)(2)(ii) (2005), from making payments for
electioneering communications, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2002); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b)(2)(iii)
(2005), and from facilitating the making of contributions, unless they are to a
segregated account of the corporation, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2002); 11 C.F.R. §
114.2(0(1) (2005). The recent Supreme Court decision in Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL) limits the breadth of the corporate
prohibition on electioneering communication. 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2652 (2007). Under
WRTL, corporations may engage in electioneering communication as long as it is not
the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy. Id. at 2673. Express advocacy is
an election law term that is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v.
Valeo (per curiam), 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the Court held that "influencing
an election" was vague and the Court would read the provisions as to only apply to
communication that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a candidate. Id. at
80. Some believe that "express advocacy" was limited to certain magic words like
"vote for" or "vote against." See WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2677 (Scalia, J., concurring);
McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 126-28 (2003). After WRTL a
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Revenue Code regulates the political activity of tax-exempt
organizations, the choice whether to apply for tax-exempt status and
under what specific provisions of the Code also has serious consequences
for the type of communication an IG may engage in.
9
In 1975, Congress passed § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code
that created a new type of tax-exempt organization, a political
organization. Entities organized under § 527 were organizations that had
ag their primary purpose the election or defeat of a candidate for public
office. 10  After the creation of political organizations in 1975, IGs
generally sought to structure themselves to take advantage of the tax-
exemption provided to political organizations under § 527.11 If an IG is a
political organization under § 527, it is not required to pay tax on the
contributions it receives, and donors contributing to the organization are
not subject to gift tax. 12  Furthermore, if a 527 organizes as an
unincorporated association, it is not subject to the restrictions placed on
corporations under federal election laws.3
corporation may not engage in express advocacy or its functional equivalent. WRTL,
127 S.Ct. at 2667.
The Supreme Court has also created some exceptions to this rule for certain tax-
exempt organizations. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life
(MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986) (finding that the corporate ban would not
apply to 501(c)(4) organizations that (1) were formed for the "express purpose of
promoting political ideas and cannot engage in business activities," (2) have no
shareholders or others with interests in its assets or earnings, (3) were not
"established by a business corporation or a labor union, and (4) it is their policy not
to accept contributions from such entities").
9. See infra, Part II.
10. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (West 2006). A 527 organization may also be formed to
influence the nomination or appointment of a governmental official. I.R.C. §
527(e)(2) (2002).
11. I.R.C. § 527(a), (c) (West 2006); see also S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 4, 25-37
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7481, 7501-13 (discussing modified
tax treatment of political organizations).
12. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(5) (West 2006). The Internal Revenue Code provides that
donors who make gifts over $12,000 are subject to gift tax on the donation. The gift
tax is generally thought to prevent donors from giving away assets prior to death to
avoid the estate tax. Moreover, even if the estate tax did not exist, donors might try
to shift their income to family members who were in lower tax brackets for income
tax purposes. Gifts to charitable organizations and to 527 political organizations are
statutorily exempt from this tax.
13. See supra, note 8 (noting restrictions on corporations).
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In 2000, however, Congress amended § 527 and added
significant disclosure requirements mandating that 527 organizations
disclose contributions in excess of $200 and expenditures in excess of
$500. 14 Thus, many organizations attempted to avoid § 527 status and
instead organized under § 501(c)(4) as social welfare organizations,
which were not subject to the disclosure requirements contained in §
527.15 Thus, the status quo at the moment is that independent groups
interested in engaging in political advocacy usually organize as either
527 Political Organizations or as 501(c)(4) Social Welfare
Organizations. 16
The current regulatory climate, however, is putting pressure on
the status quo. Many in Congress believe that the current restrictions on
527s are insufficient and that 527s should be regulated as political
committees, which would mean that 527 organizations would be subject
to significant campaign-finance regulations including contribution limits
and disclosure requirements. 7 Although there has been debate whether
political organizations can be treated as political committees,18 the threat
14. I.R.C. § 5270)(1) (West 2006). A 527 organization must disclose the
name and address of the person receiving expenditures if those expenditures exceed
$500. I.R.C. § 527(j)(3)(A). It must also disclose the name and address of each
individual who contributed an aggregate amount of $200 or more to the organization
during the calendar year. I.R.C. § 527(j)(3)(B).
15. Section 501(c)(4) organizations must be organized primarily for a social
welfare purpose, and political advocacy is not a social welfare purpose. Thus many
IGs cannot organize as 501(c)(4) organizations. See infra, Part I(B).
16. Independent groups may also be labor unions under § 501(c)(5) and
business leagues under § 501(c)(6).
17. 527 Fairness Act of 2005, H.R. 1316, 109th Cong. (2005); 527 Reform Act
of 2005, H.R. 513, 109th Cong. (2005); 527 Reform Act of 2005, S. 271, 109th
Cong. (2005); Letter from John McCain, U.S. Senator, Russell D. Feingold, U.S.
Senator, Christopher Shays, U.S. Representative, & Marty Meehan, U.S.
Representative, to Mai T. Dihn, Acting Assistant General Counsel, Federal Election
Commission (Apr. 9, 2004) (on file with Campaign Legal Center), available at
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/1I13.pdf; see Miriam Galston,
Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications for Campaign Finance
Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181, 1182-1184 (2007).
18. Edward B. Foley & Donald Tobin, Tax Code 527 Groups Not an End-Run
Around McCain-Feingold, 72 U.S.L.W. 2403, 2404 (2004) (contending that 527
organizations should be classified as political committees under FECA if their major
purpose is the election or defeat of a federal candidate). But see Allison R. Hayward
& Bradley A. Smith, Don't Shoot the Messenger: The FEC, 527 Groups, and the
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of increased regulation has encouraged IGs to consider other entities for
delivering their message.19
This Article examines whether certain taxable entities will
become the new "loophole" used by IGs to avoid campaign finance
regulations. In examining this issue, the Article will first discuss the
current regulatory structure of tax-exempt organizations and the basic
rules regarding political participation by those organizations. Part II
looks at the characteristics that independent organizations seek when
choosing an organizational form. Part III discusses various tax theories
that provide the basis for examining the tax implications of an
organization's forgoing tax-exempt status. This section analyzes whether
tax-exempt status actually matters for tax purposes. If there are no tax
benefits to organizing as a tax-exempt organization, then IGs can avoid
tax-exempt status and the regulatory burdens that come with that status.
Part IV applies the principles set out in parts II and III to determine
whether taxable entities are an efficient means of meeting an IG's
organizational goals. I then make some suggestions for the future in
light of the discussion in Parts II-IV. I also conclude that in most cases,
there will be significant tax implications if an entity forgoes tax-exempt
status. I further conclude that to the extent that taxing IGs that choose to
forgo tax-exempt status is counterintuitive and seems inconsistent with
Scope of Administrative Authority, 4 ELECTION L.J. 82, 94-97 (2005) (arguing that
527 status alone is insufficient to regulate a 527 as a political committee); Richard
Briffault, The 527 Problem... and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
949, 950 (2005) (discussing the constitutionality of regulating 527s as political
committees); Gregg Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527
Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1004 (2005) (arguing that further
regulation of 527s is unconstitutional); Galston, supra note 17 (exploring the
constitutionality of various attempts to regulate 527 organizations); Gregg D. Polsky,
A Tax Lawyer's Perspective on Section 527 Organizations, 28 CARDOZo L. REV.
1773 (Feb. 2007) (arguing that the statutory language involving the primary purpose
of an organization to influence an election should be interpreted differently for tax
and election law purposes).
19. In fact, in the recent symposium on this topic by the First Amendment Law
Review at the University of North Carolina, James Bopp, one of the leading lawyers
in the country advising independent political groups, indicated that he already knows
what he will turn to next if Congress further regulates tax-exempt organizations. In
fact, it was Mr. Bopp's comments that inspired this article. Mr. Bopp, however, did
not disclose his next entity of choice. Symposium, No Strings Attached? The First
Amendment and Tax Exempt Organizations, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1 (2007).
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normative tax principles, Congress has also recognized this fact and has
created a tax-exempt vehicle from which an IG can engage in political
advocacy. If IGs choose to avoid such status, they cannot then complain
that the tax rules, as applied to them, are unreasonable.
I. CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Under the current regulatory structure, almost all IGs operate asS• 20
tax-exempt organizations. Depending on the type of activity, they may
choose to be organized as corporations or some other type of non-
corporate entities, but almost all IGs obtain tax-exempt status under the
Internal Revenue Code. The tax code provides some type of tax-exempt
status for over twenty-seven different types of entities.21 These
organizations are generally exempt from tax on income generated by
22
activities related to the organizations' exempt purpose. Thus,
contributions to organizations are generally not considered taxable
income to the organizations. Income that is not related to the exempt
purpose of the organization (usually referred to as unrelated business
23income) and investment income is often subject to tax.
20. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional
Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625, 681-82 (2007) (noting the possibility that further
regulation of 527s might encourage entities to organize as taxable entities); Stephen
R. Weissman & Kara D. Ryan, Soft Money in the 2006 Election and the Outlook for
2007, at 1, 12 (Campaign Finance Institute, Washington D.C. 2007), available at
http://www.cfinst.org/booksreports/pdf/NPSoftmoney_06-08.pdf (noting the use
of two taxable entities to engage in some type of political advocacy).
21. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (West 2006).
22. I.R.C. § 501(a) (West 2006) (providing that an organization identified in
subsection (c) is exempt from tax). But see I.R.C. § 511 (West 2006) (providing for
the imposition of tax on the unrelated business income of an otherwise exempt
organization).
23. Investment income is also taxed up to the amount the organization spends
on political advocacy. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (West 2006) (stating that if an organization
described in section 501(c) that is exempt from tax under section 501(a) expends any
amount during the taxable year to influence a political campaign, there shall be an
amount subject to tax equal to the lesser of the net investment income or the
aggregate amount so expended during the taxable year for such an exempt function).
Section 501(c)(3) organizations are not subject to tax on investment income under
the current statutory scheme because these organizations cannot participate in any
political campaign without foregoing their tax-exempt status. Section 501(c)(4)
[Vol. 6
2007] POLITICAL ADVOCACY 49
In general, IGs seeking to engage in political activity will use
one or more tax-exempt entity. Each of these entities has advantages and
disadvantages, and in many cases an IG will use multiple tax-exempt
entities to achieve its goals. Section 501(c)(3) organizations are not
permitted to participate directly or indirectly in any political campaign on
behalf of a candidate, but they may engage in nonpartisan voter-
education activities and attempt to influence legislation as long as that is
not a substantial part of their activities.2 4  Section 501(c)(4)
25
organizations, social welfare organizations, are allowed to engage in
political activity, but the political activity must not be their primary
organizations have no such absolute restriction regarding their participation in
political campaigns, and thus to treat 501(c)(4) and 527 organizations in a similar
manner, investment income of a 501(c)(4) must be taxed to the extent of its political
activities.
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1990) (An
organization is an action organization and does not qualify for § 501(c)(3) status if it
"participates or intervenes, directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf
of or in opposition to any candidate for public office."). Section 501(c)(3)
organizations are: "Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes ... or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2006). See also Treas. Reg. §
1.501 (c)(3)- I (d)(1)(i) (describing generally which activities a 501 (c)(3) organization
may be organized and operated for in order to receive exempt status (religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, educational, or prevention of
cruelty to children or animals)); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)-(5) (specifically
defining "charitable," "educational," "testing for public safety," and "scientific" as
exempt purposes listed in § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(i)). For an in-depth analysis of the
rules related to 501(c)(3) organizations and political campaigns, see Steven H.
Sholk, A Guide to Election Year Activities of Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, in 6
TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT
VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 837 (2006).
25. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) organizations are:
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but
operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or
local associations of employees, the membership of which
is limited to the employees of a designated person or
persons . . . and the net earnings of which are devoted
exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational
purposes.
I.R.C. 501(c)(4) (West 2006).
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purpose. Section 501(c)(5) organizations, labor unions, and §
28501(c)(6), business leagues are allowed to engage in political activity
29
and are subject to similar restrictions to those of 501(c)(4)s. Section
527 organizations, however, are allowed to engage in unlimited political
activity. In fact, an entity cannot organize as a 527 political organization
unless influencing the election of a candidate for public office is the
• • 30
primary function of the organization.
A. 501(c)(3) Organizations
Section 501(c)(3) charitable organizations are treated differently
than other tax-exempt organizations. These are the organizations that
most people identify as tax-exempt organizations. They are private
schools and universities, religious institutions, and charitable
organizations. They educate our children, provide spiritual fulfillment
and help the needy. Because of this "charitable" purpose, 501(c)(3)
organizations are generally exempt from tax. In addition, the Internal
Revenue Code provides that donations to 501(c)(3) organizations are tax
deductible by the donor.3 1 Thus, 501(c)(3) organizations receive a dual
26. Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990) provides that an
organization qualifies as a section 501(c)(4) organization if "it is primarily engaged
in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the people of
the community." Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990) provides
that "the promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation
or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate
for public office." See also, Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332 (A § 501(c)(4)
organization may participate in a political campaign as long as its primary function
(its other activities) is a social welfare function.).
27. I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) organizations are "Labor, agricultural, or horticultural
organizations."
28. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) organizations are "Business leagues, chambers of
commerce, real-estate boards.., not organized for profit and no part of net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."
29. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(5), (6) (West 2006); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34, 233
(Dec. 3, 1969) (political intervention cannot be the primary activity of a 501(c)(6)
organization.)
30. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (West 2006).
31. I.R.C. § 170 (West 2006). Charitable contributions are generally defined
by section 170(c) of the Code as, among other things, a donation to a "corporation,
trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation . . . organized and operated
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tax benefit. Their income is not taxed, and donations to the organizations
are deductible by the donor. These tax benefits are considered a subsidy
32by society to 501(c)(3) organizations .
In order to ensure that tax-exempt status is not used as a means
of subsidizing political campaign activity, the tax code prohibits
501(c)(3) organizations from participating or intervening in "any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
',33public office.' There is no de minimus exception to this rule, and even
a small amount of campaign activity is prohibited.34
But this prohibition does not eliminate 501(c)(3) organizations as
a vehicle of choice for some IGs. Despite the campaign ban, 501(c)(3)
organizations may engage in voter-education drives, discuss issues,
participate in educational activities, lobby, and invite candidates to speak
35as long as the invitations are non-partisan.
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes...
or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals." I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (West
2006). This definition closely parallels the definition for an exempt organization
under section 501(c)(3) of the Code. Donations to § 501(c)(3) organizations are
deductible by operation of § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. §
170(c)(2)(D) (West 2006) (extending charitable contribution deductions for
contributions to qualified § 501(c)(3) organizations which have not participated or
intervened in any political campaign or attempted to influence legislation).
32. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1997).
33. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2006).
34. See Branch Ministries v. Rossott, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17, 21 (D.D.C. 1999),
aff'd 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (revoking Church's exemption for newspaper
advertisements urging the defeat of candidate William Jefferson Clinton). The
Service, however, rarely revokes a 501(c)(3)'s exempt status and only does so when
the organization refuses to refrain from such activities in the future or when the
violation is blatant. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FINAL REPORT, PROJECT 302:
POLITICAL ACTIVITIEES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2006),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/finalpacireport.pdf (describing
alleged acts of political campaign intervention in the 2004 election cycle and noting
that revocation was recommended in only three out of eighty-two cases).
35. For a general discussion of the rules related to 501(c)(3) organizations and
political campaigns, see Sholk, supra note 24; Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs
and the Collection Plate-Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 1 PITT. TAX REV. 35, 40-65
(2003); I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS-2006-17 (setting out various scenarios indicating
impermissible political intervention); Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 (non-
biased voting records allowed); Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73-74 (forum for
educating voters that does not promote one candidate over another is allowed).
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IGs that are willing to forgo intervention in political campaigns
for or against candidates, and are solely interested in educating the public
about issues, will clearly prefer 501(c)(3) status. These organization will
not only be tax exempt, but they will receive the added benefit that
contributions to the organizations will be tax deductible by the donors.




Section 501(c)(4) organizations are social welfare organizations
or civic leagues. 37 In order to qualify as a 501(c)(4) organization, the
organization must be primarily engaged in promoting the "common good
and general welfare" of the community.38 Intervention in a political
campaign is not considered promotion of social welfare. 39  Thus, a
501 (c)(4) organization may intervene in a political campaign on behalf of
40
a candidate, but that activity may not be its primary function. IGs that
wish to discuss issues, educate the public, or engage in other social
welfare functions may organize as 501(c)(4) organizations and may then
intervene in an election for or against a candidate as long as social
41
welfare continues to be the organizations' primary function.
36. The Code provides for an exemption from gift tax for gifts, other than gifts
of future interests, up to $12,000 per year. Thus, in general, gifts over $12,000 are
subject to gift tax, which is paid by the donor. I.R.C. § 2501 (West 2006). Donees
are secondarily liable. Gifts to 501(c)(3) and 527 organizations are not subject to
gift tax. I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2) (West 2006).
37. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (West 2006).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
40. There is some debate regarding how substantial a non-exempt function
may be. For an excellent discussion of this issue see Miriam Galston, Vision Service
Plan v. U.S.: Implications for Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4)s, EXEMPT. ORG.
TAX REv. 165 (2006) (non-exempt activities should not be more than an
insubstantial part of an organization's overall activities). See also Greg Colvin et al.,
Comments of the Individual Members of the Exempt Organizations Committee's
Task Force on Section 501(c)(4) and Politics, May 25, 2004, reprinted in TAX
NOTEs TODAY, 102-16 (2004) (arguing for a safe harbor provision providing that 40
percent of an organization's activities may be for a non-exempt purpose).
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
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Although the income of § 501(c)(4) organizations is tax-exempt,
donations to 501 (c)(4) organizations are not deductible by the donor. In
addition, if a 501(c)(4) has investment income, that investment income is
taxable dollar for dollar to the extent the organization has spent funds to
intervene in a political campaign.42 For example, a 501(c)(4) with
$3,000 in investment income and $2,000 in political expenditures will
find $2,000 of its investment income subject to tax.
Finally, while the law is a little unsettled in this area,
contributions to 501(c)(4) organizations may be subject to gift tax.4 3 The
Service's position has been that contributions to tax-exempt entities over
$12,000 are subject to gift tax unless there is a specific statutory
44
exception that applies. Section 501(c)(3) and 527 organizations are
statutorily exempt from gift tax, but 501(c)(4) organizations are not.45
C. 501(c)(5) and (c)(6) Organizations
Section 501(c)(5) organizations, labor unions, and 501(c)(6)
organizations, business leagues, are regulated in the same way as
501(c)(4) organizations. These organizations are allowed to intervene in
political campaigns, but intervening in a political campaign must not be
their primary function. Just as with 501(c)(4) organizations, the Code
does not require 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6) organizations to disclose their
contributions or expenditures except in very limited circumstances.
These organizations, however, are also not exempt from the gift tax, so
donors who contribute more than $12,000 may be subject to gift tax on
their contributions.
42. I.R.C. § 527(f) (West 2006).
43. See infra note 181.
44. The Code provides that the first $12,000 given to a person or entity is not
subject to gift tax. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 2006) (setting the exempt amount at
$10,000 and noting that it is adjusted for inflation). Others have argued that
501(c)(4) organizations are not subject to gift tax. See infra, note 72.
45. I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2) (West 2006) (gifts to 501(c)(3) are not subject to gift
tax); I.R.C. § 2501(a)(4) (West 2006) (exempting gifts to § 527 political
organizations from the gift tax).
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D. 527 Organizations
Prior to passage of § 527, many political organizations did not
qualify as tax-exempt under any of the above sections because their
primary activity involved intervention in a political campaign. No other
tax-exempt organization is allowed to have intervention in a political
campaign as its primary purpose. Congress's solution was to create a
tax-exempt entity under section 527 for organizations whose primary
46
purpose was to influence elections. Section 527 organizations are
exempt from tax on their "exempt function income," which is defined as
contributions, membership dues, and proceeds from political
fundraisers. 47 They are, however, subject to tax on investment income or
48
on other income that is not exempt function income. Contributions to
527 organizations are also statutorily exempt from the gift tax.49 Unlike
other tax-exempt organizations, however, § 527 organizations are subject
to a significant disclosure regime. This regime requires most 527
organizations to disclose contributions in excess of $200 and
expenditures in excess of $500.50
Finally § 527 appears to have been written in a way that makes
inclusion into its regulatory regime mandatory. 51  Generally, an
organization wishing to be exempt from tax applies for exempt status
with the Service, and the Service either accepts or rejects that
application. Political organizations do not need to apply for section 527
status, and are considered 527 organizations as long as they meet the
definition of a political organization that is contained in section 527.
Section 527 provides that a political organization is an organization
"operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting
46. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (West 2006).
47. I.R.C. § 527(c)(3) (West 2006).
48. I.R.C. §§ 527(c)(3), (f) (West 2006).
49. I.R.C. §2501(a)(4) (West 2006).
50. I.R.C. §§ 527(j)(1), (j)(3)(A), (j)(3)(B) (West 2006).
51. See Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 148 F. Supp.
2d 1273, 1282 (S.D. Ala. 2001); Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United
States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1308 n.7 (S.D. Ala. 2002); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv.
200037040 (Sept. 15, 2000) (indicating that § 527 is not an elective provision); Rev.
Rul. 2003-49, 2003-20 I.R.B. 903 (indicating in answer 20 that an organization is
subject to 527 if it meets the definition of political organization in §527(e)).
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contributions or making expenditures" to influence the "selection,
nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal,
State or local public office. 52 Under 527(i) an organization must give
notice to the Secretary that it wishes to be treated as a 527 organization.
A 527 organization that does not give notice is subject to tax under
527(i)(4). Thus, according to the Service, an organization is a political
organization if it meets the definition in 527(e) even if the organization
does not notify the Secretary under 527(i). 53  Under the Service's
interpretation, the organization is a political organization that has failed
to make disclosures under 527(i). Because § 527 status may not be
elective, organizations seeking to avoid 527's regulatory regime by
forgoing tax-exempt status may find that all their contributions and
expenditures are subject to tax under § 527(i)(4).54
The question whether 527 is elective or compulsory is extremely
important for an IG trying to organize as a taxable organization. If the
Service is right and any organization meeting the definition of a political
organization in 527 is treated as a tax-exempt political organization, then
most IGs will not benefit from organizing as a taxable entity. Even if the
IG organizes as a taxable entity the Service would argue that 527(i)(4)
applies and that it should be taxed on all of its nondisclosed contributions
and expenditures. If that position prevails, choosing a taxable entity will
only be attractive to organizations that do not have as their primary
purpose the influencing of elections.
Making § 527 non-elective is rational if § 527 is designed as a
campaign-finance regulation. Congress wanted to mandate disclosure of
all organizations with certain characteristics, and used the tax code as a
means of obtaining that disclosure. The idea is that tax-exempt status is
a benefit and disclosure is merely a requirement of obtaining that benefit.
This rationale may not survive First Amendment challenge, however, if
the entity itself is organized as a taxable entity. If the organization is set
up as a taxable organization and pays tax based on those principles, then
the organization is not receiving a subsidy as a condition of tax-exempt
52. I.R.C. §527(e)(1), (2) (West 2006).
53. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 200037040 (Sept. 15, 2000).
54. I.R.C. § 527(i)(4) (West 2006).
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status, and it would be harder for Congress to justify the statute based on
a subsidy rationale.
55
II. CHOICE OF ENTITY
Statutes regulating entities in the tax and campaign-finance arena
usually have addressed two different concerns. One set of rules is
designed to ensure that the benefits of tax-exempt status or of corporate
form are not abused. For example, § 501(c)(3) organizations are not only
exempt from taxation but also receive contributions that are deductible to
the donor. This means that the public indirectly subsidizes these
organizations. Because of this subsidy, Congress has prevented
501(c)(3)s from intervening in an election on behalf of a candidate for
public office.56 This regulation can be seen as an attempt to protect the
integrity of 501(c)(3) organizations and the public fisc. This type of
regulation impacts political advocacy, but does not have as its primary
purpose the regulation of political campaigns.
The second set of rules places restrictions on entities for the
purpose of regulating campaign activities. Here, Congress is trying to
achieve a campaign regulatory end, and it is using the entity status as a
means of implementing those regulations. Section 527's disclosureS57
provisions are a clear example of this type of regulation. The recent
decision in WRTL makes it even more likely that Congress will attempt
to achieve campaign regulatory ends through other means. For example,
instead of regulating the campaign activities of corporations and unions
through election laws, Congress could regulate those organizations by
requiring corporations "and unions to obtain shareholder or member
approval before engaging in electioneering communication. Because
55. See Donald. B. Tobin, Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 37 G.L. REV. 611, 636-682 (2003) (discussing constitutional
questions spawning litigation on whether the statute is mandatory).
56. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2006).
57. See Mayer, supra note 20 (creating an institutional choice model and
arguing that the IRS is not the institution of choice for campaign regulation of 527
political organizations).
such efforts would be time consuming and expensive, corporations and
labor unions might forgo engaging in electioneering communication.
58
When Congress is regulating in this manner-using an
organization's entity status as a means of regulating political activity-
there is a serious concern that the regulations may violate the First
Amendment. As I have previously argued, in order to survive First
Amendment scrutiny, the regulation either must be constitutional
according to traditional campaign-finance jurisprudence or must be a
permissible condition that is placed on an organization in order to receive
some government subsidy or benefit.59 If the provision meets the first
requirement there is really no need to consider the second part of the
equation. But if the basis for finding a restriction constitutional is the
fact that a benefit is received as a condition of the regulation, an essential
component of such a finding is that a benefit is actually received. If the
tax code is used as the justification for regulating an entity, in order to
assess the constitutionality of the restriction, we need to know the tax
consequences to an organization if it was not considered tax-exempt.
6 °
In other words, we need to know whether the organization is actually
receiving a tax benefit in order to know whether the condition placed on
it is actually a restriction based on a benefit received by the organization.
A discussion of this issue is contained is Parts III and IV.
58. In fact, I can see a very strong argument that corporations and unions have
First Amendment rights but that for corporate governance reasons we do not want
corporations or unions using shareholder or member funds for political advocacy
unless a majority of the shareholders or members approve of such action. Moreover,
such a regulation would be more rationally related to the purpose of the regulation.
Nonprofit organizations, like Massachusetts Citizens for Life, were not the type of
organizations that Congress was originally trying to regulate with the corporate ban,
and the Court later found an exception to the corporate ban for MCFL-type
organizations. A MCFL-type organization would not be subject to the regulation I
discuss because it would not be a for-profit corporation with shareholders.
59. See Tobin, supra note 55, at 636-82.
60. I have examined this issue at length in the context of § 527 organizations
and argue that § 527 organizations do receive a tax benefit. See Tobin, supra note
55, at 638-651, 653-655. But see Roger Colinvaux, Regulation of Political
Organizations and the Red Herring of Tax Exempt Status, 59 NAT'L TAX J. 531
(2006); Polsky & Charles, supra note 7 (concluding that 527 organizations to not
receive a tax benefit).
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What is particularly important in examining the regulation of IGs
is the understanding that the form of the entity (under tax and business
law) impacts the regulation of the political speech. Entity choice here
matters. If the regulation of the entity is based on protecting the fisc
and/or limiting abuse of a tax benefit, then entity regulation makes sense.
But if the purpose of the restrictions is to engage in campaign-finance
regulation, then entity-based restrictions are extremely hard to justify.
Proponents of this entity-based regulation need to be able to justify why
a particular entity is somehow more corruptive or dangerous than
another.6'
Since entity-based regulation is not primarily concerned with the
content of the speech but instead is more concerned with the organization
structure, entity-based regulation provides an incentive for IGs to seek
out the entity status that places the fewest restrictions on their
advocacy. 6' These entity-based restrictions impose a cost on IGs
61. For example, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo upheld the regulation
of Political Action Committees because of the concern that these entities had
influencing elections as their primary purpose. 424 U.S. 1, 35-36, (1976) (per
curiam). Thus, the Supreme Court determined that corruption concerns allowed for
regulation of these entities even for speech that was not express advocacy. Some
have sought the regulation of 527s on similar grounds. Professor Foley and I argued
that section 527s whose primary purpose is influencing federal elections can be
regulated as PACs. See Edward B. Foley and Donald Tobin, Tax Code Section 527
Not an End-Run Around McCain-Feingold, 72 U.S.L.W. 2403 (2004). Others have
argued that 527s can be regulated simply based on their status as a 527 organization.
See Disclosure of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 73-
80 (2000) (testimony of Frances R. Hill, Professor, University of Miami School of
Law). Similarly in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Supreme Court
recognized that the unique legal and economic characteristics of the corporate entity
coupled with a state's desire to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption
constituted a sufficiently compelling rationale for a state to place certain regulations
on political expenditures by corporations. 494 U.S. 652, 658-660 (1990). The Court
recognized that state law grants the corporate entity "special advantages-limited
liability, . . . perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and
distribution of assets ... [that can be used] ... to obtain an unfair advantage in the
political marketplace" over other entities. Id. at 658-59 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S.
238, 257 (1986)) (alteration added).
62. In addition to this entity-based regulation, § 527 organizations are also
subject to federal election law if they engage in activities that are covered by the
Federal Election Campaign Act. For the most part, these regulations are content-
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engaged in political advocacy. The cost may be financial or it may be
speech related. Thus many IGs face the same type of organizational
questions that businesses face in choosing the entity through which they
want to conduct business.
In choosing the entity through which IGs conduct political
advocacy, the IGs have four major concerns. First, they would prefer to
maximize their resources and thus prefer a vehicle that would subject
them to the least amount of tax. Second, IGs seek limited liability due to
the increased litigiousness of political campaigns, the increased
harshness of the content of many political ads, and the very real concern
that IGs will be sued for defamation. Third, many independent groups
prefer that their donors remain anonymous. This may be because they do
not want the public to know the real supporters of a particular message,
they fear retribution for the message, the message is unpopular, or the
donors prefer to remain out of the public eye. Finally, IGs want as much
flexibility as possible to engage in the widest range of political advocacy.
For example, under federal election law, corporations and labor unions,
with some small exceptions, are not allowed to engage in certain types of
political communication and are also limited in how they can make
political contributions.63 IGs, therefore, often do not want the constraints
64
that are placed on them by organizing as corporations.
Finally, it is important to recognize that if an organization is
determined to be a political action committee (PAC), then entity choice
is no longer extremely important.65  PACs are already subject to
based and apply regardless of whether the entity engages in the communication.
This is not true, however, if the organization is a political committee under FECA.
If an organization is a political committee, it is subject to the contribution limitations
and disclosure provisions in FECA. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a), 433, 434 (2007). In
addition, corporations and labor unions are statutorily prohibited from engaging in
express advocacy or electioneering communication. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2007).
63. See supra note 8.
64. See MCFL, 479 U.S. 238 (The nonprofit corporation argued successfully
that the corporate restrictions should not apply to it. Had the restrictions applied,
MCFL would have either had to organize as a political committee and thus be
subject to those stringent regulatory requirements or been prohibited from publishing
its newsletter urging readers to vote "pro-life.").
65. The term "political committee" is defined, in relevant part, as: "(A) any
committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures
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contribution limitations and to disclosure obligations, and properly
organized PACs are not subject to the corporate ban on making political
66
contributions. PACs routinely organize as corporations and file for
status as tax-exempt organizations under § 527. In fact, the legislative
history surrounding 527 suggests that Congress contemplated that all
527s would be PACs.67
A. Tax Liability
Independent Groups seek to maximize their influence in the
political process, and many raise large sums of money to do so. It is
inefficient for those organizations to pay as much as 35 percent of the
amount of money they raise to the government in the form of taxes. As
discussed in the next part, the choice of entity by the IGs may have a
significant impact on their tax liability and thus on the amount of money
that organizations will have to spend on advocacy.
For example, 501(c)(3), (c)(4) and 527 organizations generally
do not have to pay tax on contributions they receive. 68  In some
circumstances, 501(c)(4)s and 527 organizations have to pay tax on
investment income, and 527s that choose not to meet the disclosure
obligations in § 527(i) must pay tax on non-disclosed contributions and• 69
expenditures.
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year; or (B) any separate
segregated fund established under the provisions of section 441b(b) of this title." 2
U.S.C. § 431(4) (2007). The FEC has also promulgated regulations defining the
term "political committee." 11 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2007).
66. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2007) (contribution and expenditure limitations); 2
U.S.C. § 441b(c) (electioneering communication limitation). PACs cannot receive
corporate contributions although corporations may pay the administrative and
fundraising costs of PACs connected to the corporation.
67. See Tobin, supra note 55, at 625 ("At the time Congress passed § 527 an
organization whose primary purpose was to influence the election of a candidate for
public office was subject to FECA and would have been regulated as a PAC.
Buckley v. Valeo, which limited the reach of FECA, was not decided until 1976.
Thus it is fair to conclude that when § 527 was passed, Congress expected that
political organizations would be regulated as political committees.").
68. I.R.C. §§ 501(a), 527(c)(3)(A) (West 2006).
69. I.R.C. § 527(f) (West 2006). Section 501(c)(4) organizations are subject to
tax on investment income to the extent that the organization makes expenditures for
an "exempt function" under § 527. This generally means that when a 501(c)(4)
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An IG must also be concerned with whether contributions to it
will be considered a gift subject to federal gift tax. The gift tax is levied
on the donor, so there would be no direct tax to the IG, but if donors
were required to pay gift tax on amounts they contributed to IGs then
donors would either be less likely to give or would give smaller amounts,
adjusting their contributions for the cost of the tax. 70  Section 527
organizations are statutorily exempt from the gift tax rules,7 ' but there is
serious disagreement whether contributions to 501(c)(4) organizations
are subject to gift tax. 2  In most cases, however, IGs that choose to
organize as tax-exempt organizations end up with little or no tax liability.
B. Limited Liability
IGs are often formed and operated by influential people with
significant personal wealth.73  IGs are also often engaged in activities
that might subject the organizations to suit.74 Organizers of IGs are
engages in political advocacy, it will have to pay tax on the amount it spends on
political advocacy to the extent of its investment income. If the 501(c)(4) has more
in investment income than it spends on political advocacy, the remaining investment
income is not subject to tax; I.R.C. § 527(c) (2007) (exempting exempt function
income from tax but not including investment income in the definition of exempt
function income).
70. Although donors are responsible for the gift tax, donees are secondarily
liable. I.R.C. § 6324(b) (West 2006).
71. The gift tax does not apply to donations to political organizations
organized under § 527. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(4) (West 2006).
72. See Barbara K. Rhomberg, The Law Remains Unsettled on Gift Taxation of
Section 501(c)(4) Contributions, 15 TAX'N OF EXEMPTS 62, 65 (Sept.-Oct. 2003)
(recognizing the Service's position that donations to 501(c)(4)s are subject to the gift
tax but arguing that the Service position may not survive court challenges); see also
Carson v. Comm'r, 641 F.2d 864, 865-66 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding payment was for
donor's own economic advantage and campaign contributions are not gifts within
meaning of gift tax law); Stem v. United States, 436 F.2d 1327, 1329-30 (5th Cir.
1971) (finding donations to political organizations were not subject to the gift tax).
73. Even individuals without significant wealth are interested in protecting the
wealth that they have.
74. See Posting of Ned Barnett to Barnett and Toor on PR, High-Risk (to the
PR Person/Agency) PR (May 15, 2006), http:/ibamettmarcom.blogspot.com/2006/
05/high-risk-to-pr-personagency-pr.html (Kerry threat to sue Swift Boat Veterans for
Truth). Henry Mark Holzer & Erika Holzer, Legal Terrorism (Aug. 10, 2004),
http://www.swiftvets.com/article.php?story=20040810190737687. See also Edward
POLITICAL AD VOCA CY20071
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 6
therefore increasingly seeking an organizational form that helps protect
the organizers, contributors, and employees from liability.
The organizational decision regarding limited liability is a
business organization question not a tax question. The form of the
organization for tax purposes is not controlling. Instead, what is
important is the treatment of the organizations under state law. IGs
seeking liability protection thus need an organizational form that
provides for limited liability under state law. The problem for IGs is that
the corporate form provides the best means of limiting liability but
• . 75
campaign finance laws limit a corporation's activities. For example,
corporations are prohibited from using corporate funds to make
contributions to candidates, from engaging in electioneering
communication that is the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy,7 6
and from expressly advocating7 for or against a candidate for public
B. Foley & David Goldberger, The Swift Boat Ad: A Legal Analysis (Aug. 13, 2004),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part3/campaignfalse02.html; Lassa v.
Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 679 (Wis. 2006) (Candidate brought defamation action
against organization that sent out a mailer stating that Lass "hooked up" with the
then-State Senate Majority Leader and asserting "'[n]obody knows for sure what she
had to promise to gain his approval."' (alteration added). The defamation suit was
ultimately engulfed in a larger dispute regarding Rongstad's refusal during discovery
to provide the names of people who contributed to his organization.).
75. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2000); 11 C.F.R. § 110.1 (amended 2005). See
also 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b)(1) (amended 2005) (corporations are prohibited from
making contributions in connection with an election for any Federal office); 11
C.F.R. § 1 14.2(b)(2)(ii)-(iii) (corporations are also prohibited from making any
expenditures with respect to a federal election and making payments for
electioneering communications); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(0(1) (corporations are also
prohibited from facilitating the making of contributions, unless they are to a
segregated account of the corporation). As discussed supra the Court limited the
restrictions on electioneering communication by corporations to electioneering
communication that was the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy. WRTL,
127 S.Ct. 2652, 2655 (2007).
76. Electioneering communication is defined as "broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication which ... refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office
.... and is made within sixty days of a general election or thirty days before a
primary. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2007).
77. Express advocacy is an election law term that is derived from the Supreme
Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In
Buckley, the Court held that the "influencing an election" was vague and the Court
would read the provisions as to only apply to communication that expressly
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office. Some IGs organize as corporations and comply with the
restrictions on corporations. 79  They simply refrain from making
contributions to candidates, and avoid engaging in express advocacy or
its equivalent.80  This is a strategic decision by the IG, and IGs can
engage in political advocacy even if they are corporations. The decision
to incorporate, however, does restrict the breadth of an IG's
communication. An IG can attempt to work around this problem by
creating two organizations, one a PAC that takes only hard money and
can engage in these restricted activities, and the second a non-PAC
• • 81
corporate 527 that cannot engage in the restricted activities. This
strategy, however, may not work if Congress increases the regulation on
527 organizations, or if Congress seeks other means of regulating
corporations in light of the Court's decision in WRTL.
advocated the election or defeat of a candidate. Some believe that "express
advocacy" was limited to certain magic words like "vote for" or "vote against." If
one engages in express advocacy, then that communication is regulated by the
Federal Election Campaign Act, and the contribution limitations and disclosure
provisions of the Act apply. See supra note 8.
78. See discussion of WRTL, supra note 8.
79. Some IGs have received the benefit of corporate status without being
subject to many of the restrictions placed on corporations. These organizations take
advantage of an exception for organizations that meet specific requirements set out
by the Supreme Court in MCFL. See supra note 8 (discussing corporate restrictions
and MCFL exception.).
80. In fact, many IGs are willing to organize as corporations and live with the
restrictions on corporate activity. These organizations generally engage in lobbying
and issue discussion. They avoid using express advocacy and electioneering
communication. Moreover, since electioneering communication does not include
communication over the Internet, many IGs have determined that they can still get
their message out without having to engage in electioneering communication. The
point here is not that corporate IGs cannot engage in any activity, but that organizing
as a corporation limits the activities an organization can engage in.
81. The term "electioneering communication" means any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication which: (1) refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal
office; (2) is made within sixty days before a general, special, or runoff election for
the office sought by the candidate or thirty days before a primary or preference
election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate
a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and (3) in the case of a
communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice
President, is targeted to the relevant electorate. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 § 201(a)(3), 116 Stat. at 89.
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At the moment, it is unclear how important limited liability is to
IGs. To date, there has not been a groundswell of suits against IGs for
82defamation. As the political environment heats up, however, large
contributors may be fearful that they will be held personally liable if the
IG does not have limited liability and is sued. It is too early to tell if this




Some contributors to IGs wish to remain anonymous so IGs may
try to choose an organizational form that will not require the disclosure
of contributions. Under current election law, entities that engage in
express advocacy or electioneering communication must disclose the
contributions and expenditures connected to that communication. 84 As
discussed earlier, the choice of the entity under either state law or tax law
would have no bearing on whether the entity was required to disclose
amounts spent on express advocacy or electioneering communication.
These are speech-related disclosures and are not entity based. IGs
engage in a broad range of communication that is neither express
advocacy nor electioneering communication, and the choice of entity
decision will have significant ramifications on the extent to which
disclosure regulations will apply to those communications.
82. Defamation suits against candidates, however, exist, and there is no reason
to believe that IGs would never be the target of such a claim. See, e.g., William P.
Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 285
(2004) (analyzing constitutional issues raised by regulations concerning false
campaign speech).
83. James Bopp raised the liability concern at the symposium sponsored by
FALR. Symposium, No Strings Attached? The First Amendment and Tax-Exempt
Organizations, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 1 (2007).
84. 11 C.F.R. § 104.50) (as amended in 2005) (requiring every person who has
made a disbursement for the direct costs of producing or airing electioneering
communications as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 100.29 (amended 2005) aggregating in
excess of $10,000 during any calendar year to file a statement with the FEC within
twenty-four hours). See also 11 C.F.R. § 104.20 (2003) (detailing how to report
electioneering communications as set forth in 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2000) and 11
C.F.R. § 104.50)).
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Entities that choose to organize as § 527 political organizations
are subject to a significant disclosure regime. Section 527 requires the
IG to disclose all contributions over $200 and all expenditures over
$500.85  Because of these disclosure obligations, IGs appear to be
86
shifting their entity choice to 501(c)(4) organizations. Section
501(c)(4) organizations are required to disclose their large donors to the
IRS on an annual basis, but this information is not available to the
public.87
Thus, to the extent the disclosure obligations are entity based and
not communication based, IGs will strongly consider the disclosure
obligations when making choice-of-entity decisions.
D. Free Speech
Election and tax law place some restriction on the freedom IGs
have to engage in political speech. For example, a 501(c)(3)
organization is allowed to speak about important national issues and is
allowed to engage in a limited amount of lobbying, but is statutorily
prohibited from intervening in a "political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office."'88 Similarly, a section
501(c)(4) organization must be organized primarily to engage in social
welfare activities, and political advocacy is not considered a social
85. I.R.C. § 527(j)(3)(B) (West 2006) (contribution non-disclosure limit of
$200); I.R.C. § 527(j)(3)(A) (expenditure non-disclosure limit of $500).
86. See Stephen R. Weissman and Kara D. Ryan, Soft Money in the 2006
Election and the Outlook for 2008: The Changing Nonprofits Landscape, Campaign
Finance Institute Report (2007), available at http://www.cfinst.org/books-reports/
pdf/NP_Softmoney_06-08.pdf; See also The New Stealth PACs: Tracking 501(c)
Non-Profit Groups Active in Elections, Public Citizen Report (2004), available at
http://www.stealthpacs.org/ documents/StealthPACs.pdf. In addition, some Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) regulations require organizations to disclose
the purchaser of communication that appears on the airwaves. In certain
circumstances, entity status may control what information needs to be disclosed to
the FCC. See 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (radio); 47 C.F.R. §
76.1715 (TV).
87. Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(b)-l(b)(2). See also I.R.C. § 6104(b) (West 2006)
(requiring Service to make Form 990s, filed by 501(c) organization public but
authorizing Service to withhold names and addresses of contributors).
88. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2006).
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welfare activity. 89 Finally, as previously noted, most corporations are not
entitled to contribute to candidates, engage in electioneering
communication, or engage in express advocacy. Therefore, in choosing
entity status, IGs want the entity that will provide them with the most
flexibility regarding the type of communication in which they want to
engage. Since most corporations are prohibited from engaging in
express advocacy or electioneering communication that is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy and from making contributions to
candidates, corporate status may be a poor choice for most organizations
that want to engage in a wide variety of communication designed to
influence an election.
There is, however, a limited exception to the restriction on
corporations for corporations that meet the criteria set out in
Massachusetts Citizens for Life.9 1 The MCFL exception allows non-
profit social-welfare organizations to engage in express advocacy if the
organizations are not engaged in business, have no shareholders or others
with interests in their assets, and do not receive funds from for-profit
corporations or unions.
92
At the moment, it appears that for organizations that qualify for
the exception in MCFL, organizing as corporations and seeking tax-
exempt status under § 501(c)(4) provides the most flexibility with regard
to the types of speech they may engage in.93 For those organizations that
do not qualify for the MCFL exception, organizing as unincorporated
associations and seeking tax-exempt status under section 527 provides
the most flexibility. As Congress considers further regulation of 527
89. Some commentators argue that 501(c)(4) organizations should only be
allowed to engage in an insubstantial amount of non-social welfare activity. See
Galston, supra note 40. Professor Galston's position is certainly more consistent
with the statutory language in § 501(c)(4) providing that a (c)(4) organization must
be "operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare." I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)
(West 2006).
90. 11 CFR § l10.1(g) (2007).
91. See supra note 8.
92. MFCL, 479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986).
93. There appears to be nothing that would prevent a § 527 organization from
organizing as a limited liability corporation. This would provide the IG with limited
liability, and it could still apply for tax-exempt status under § 527. For a discussion
of the use of LLCs see infra Part IV.
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organizations and as concerns about liability increase, groups may be
seeking alternative entity structures to engage in political advocacy.
III. TAXATION OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The central question in determining whether IGs can use taxable
entities to engage in political activity is whether those organizations have
taxable income and what the tax liability would be if the IG were not a
tax-exempt entity. If an IG has no taxable income then there is no need
for an IG to organize as a tax-exempt organization. This part looks at the
history surrounding the taxation of political organizations and examines
whether there would be tax consequences to an IG if it organized as a
for-profit entity. This history is important because some have argued
that the history indicates that political organizations have not
traditionally been subject to tax and that § 527 status does not, therefore,
• 94
confer a tax benefit on those organizations. The fact that political
organizations were not historically taxed does not, however, answer the
question of how a taxable IG would be taxed unless we know the basis
for that exemption. Moreover, the history surrounding the taxation of
political organizations indicates that the justification for exempting them
from tax has been complicated and controversial.
A. History of the Tax Treatment of Political Organizations
Prior to the passage of § 527 of the Code, the tax treatment of
political organizations was ad hoc and potentially inconsistent with
normative tax principles. At first, the Service basically ignored political
organizations, and generally took the position that political organizations
did not need to file tax returns. 95 The rationale for this non-statutory
94. See generally Colinvaux , supra note 60.
95. Prior to 1974 there was no specific definition of a political organization.
Section 527 of the Code defines a political organization as an organization operated
for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the selection, nomination,
election, or appointment of any individual to any federal, state, or local public office.
I.R.C. §§ 527(e)(1), (2); S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 25 (1974), as reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7502. See Tax Treatment of Contributions of Appreciated
Property, to Committees of Political Parties, 37 Fed. Reg. 22427 (Oct. 19, 1972)
(Notice of Opportunity to Submit Written Comments to Request for Public Hearing)
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exemption is unclear. At that time, political organizations were either
political parties or candidate committees. The exemption was either
founded on the principle that political contributions were "political gifts"
and that political organizations therefore had no taxable income, 96 or it
was based on the notion that the payments to candidates were held in
quasi-trust by the party or political organization.97
In 1939, the Service ruled on whether (1) "contributions to
political organizations are allowable deductions in the donor's Federal
income tax return and (2) political gifts or donations to individuals or to
political organizations are subject to Federal income tax."'98  The
formation of the question indicates that these types of payments were
viewed as some type of gift.99 Absent a gift rationale it would be
obvious that contributions to political organizations were not deductible.
The Service ultimately concluded that contributions were not deductible
but that "a political gift ... received by an individual or [by] a political
organization... is not taxable income to the recipient."10 0
In 1954, the Service confirmed that a "political gift" is not
taxable income to the recipient.10 1 Revenue Ruling 54-80 dealt with
whether funds contributed to a political candidate were taxable if the
funds were diverted for the candidate's personal use. The Service
recognized that political gifts to candidates were not taxable, but
concluded that once the funds were diverted for personal use, the funds
(indicating that it is a matter of history that the Service has never required political
committees to file income tax returns because it believed that virtually all of the
receipts were from gifts).
96. See S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 25 (1974) (indicating the payments were
excluded as gifts), Tax Treatment of Contributions of Appreciated Property, to
Committees of Political Parties, supra note 95.
97. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,499 (Feb. 8, 1974) (claiming the precise
justification for excluding political campaign contributions from gross income has
never been clearly articulated, but that it is clear that the justification is not that the
contributions are gifts); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813, 41, n.32 (Mar. 20, 1990)
(claiming conduit or quasi-trust rationale was the reason for the exclusion), reprinted
in [1986-1990 Transfer Binder] IRS Pos. (CCH) & 2208, at 7540.
98. I.T. 3276, 1939-1 C.B. 108.
99. If the contributions were not a gift then it is clear that it would not be
deductible from income.
100. I.T. 3276, 1939-1 C.B. 108 (alteration added).
101. Rev. Rul. 54-80, 1954-1 C.B. 11.
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were taxable to the recipient. The Service, however, provided no real
discussion of how it reached its conclusion.
The conclusion in Revenue Ruling 54-80, however, may shed
light on why the Service later moved away from the gift rationale as the
basis for excluding political donations. If the contribution is considered
a gift to the candidate, then the candidate might have a right to the
money tax free even if the candidate used the money in his personal
capacity. It would simply be a gift to the candidate, and gifts are not
taxable under § 102 of the Code. If, however, the exclusion is not based
on the gift rationale, then the tax treatment when funds are diverted to
candidates becomes clearer. Under that logic, there is some special
exception for political campaigns, and when the money is diverted that
special treatment is not applicable.
In 1968, the Service once again indicated that contributions to
. 102
organizations should be treated as gifts. In a Technical Advice
Memorandum, the Service considered the tax consequences to an
organization that had its tax-exempt status revoked because it intervened
in an election on behalf of a candidate. Because the organization was not
tax-exempt for the years in question, the Service had to determine the
taxable income of the organization during that period. The Service
concluded that contributions to the taxable organization were not
included in the gross income of the organization because they were gifts
under § 102.103 The Service explicitly rejected the notion that the
contributor's intention to further the organization's general objectives
defeated gift treatment.'0 4 The Service recognized that if "the presence
of a motive to accomplish certain general objectives would rule out a
finding of gift, then taxpayers could never claim a deduction" for
contributions to tax-exempt organizations because "taxpayers when
making contributions, invariably seek to accomplish some objective,
although such objective may be very broad.', 10 5
Thus, by 1968 the Service had worked out a way to deal with the
taxation of contributions to political organizations. Contributions to
102. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 681212 1OOOA (Dec. 12, 1968) (finding contributions
to § 501(c)(3)s made during period that exempt status was revoked were not income
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political parties, candidates, or organizations were gifts. In the case of
the candidate, the contributions were not gifts to the candidate in his
personal capacity, but were gifts to his political campaign. If the funds
were diverted for the candidate's personal use then they would be treated
as income to the candidate, unless that candidate could prove that the
funds were gifts to him in his personal capacity.
By 1972, political campaigns and organizations were becoming
more sophisticated and there were complicated tax issues surrounding
the donation of appreciable property and the taxation of investment
income. Political parties were encouraging people to give appreciable
property to the party. The taxpayer would not have to pay tax on the
built-up gain in the property, and the political party could sell the
property tax free (because the Service was not requiring political parties
to file returns). The Service then released a notice regarding a public
hearing on the tax treatment of political parties. 10 6 In that notice the
Service stated "[i]t has been the position of the Internal Revenue Service
that campaign contributions are gifts for gift tax purposes."'10 7 The notice
further recognized that the Service has not required political parties to
file tax returns and stated "[i]t appears that this practice had its inception
and was continued in the belief that virtually all of the receipts of the
parties were from gifts and that the parties would not have taxable
income." 10 8 Although the notice is qualified with "it appears," clearly as
late as 1972 the gift rationale was the best justification the Service could
articulate for not subjecting contributions to political parties to income
tax. It is therefore not surprising that a 1974 Senate Report on political
organizations indicated that political contributions were not taxed
because they were considered gifts.109  Moreover, at the time, the
Service's position was clear that such payments were subject to the gift
tax. '
0
106. See Tax Treatment of Contributions of Appreciated Property, to
Committees of Political Parties, supra note 95 (Notice of Opportunity to Submit
Written Comments to Request for Public Hearing).
107. Id. (alteration added).
108. Id. (alteration added).
109. S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 25, 32 (1974).
110. See Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972-2 C.B. 532 (finding political contributions
subject to the gift tax); Announcement 73-84, 1973-2 C.B. 461-462 (announcing
new policy with regard to the taxation of political organizations and re-affirming the
Interestingly, at about the same time that Congress was
considering codifying tax-exempt status for political organizations, the
Service began articulating a different reason for not treating
contributions to political organizations as income. In 1973, the Service
considered whether political contributions donated to a charity upon the
death of the candidate were included in the candidate's estate. In
reaching its conclusion, the General Counsel Memorandum indicated
that the Service's position regarding the taxation of campaign
contributions was that they were not taxable if used for campaign
purposes but would be taxable if they were for personal use."' The
Service also indicated that it had concluded that it would assume that
contributions were not intended as gifts to the candidate for his personal
use absent evidence to the contrary. 112 The basis for this assumption was
that contributions were given with the intent that they be used for
campaign purposes, and that assumption gave rise to a quasi-trust
relationship. 1 3 In other words, the Service argued that the candidate
holds the contribution in trust for the contributor and must use the funds
in the manner the contributor wanted (i.e. to promote the candidate's
campaign). From this theory, the General Counsel Memorandum
concludes that the "quasi-trust relationship forms the basis for the




In 1974, the Service considered whether contributions to an
officeholder to pay office expenses were excludable from gross
income. 115  The Service indicated that "[p]olitical campaign expense
contributions have received unique treatment by the Service and the
Service's position that contributions are subject to gift tax.). As previously
discussed, the test for a gift for income tax purposes is different than the test for
whether there is a gift for estate tax purposes. See supra note 96. However, the
Service's position that nothing is received in exchange for the contribution for estate
tax purposes also implies that the payment was a gift for income tax purposes.
111. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,462 (Aug. 31, 1973).
112. Id.
113. Id. This makes sense with regard to why diverted funds are taxable.
They were not intended as gifts to the candidate in his personal capacity. It does not,
however, indicate that the trust theory was the basis of the exclusion. As discussed
infra, the trust theory does not work. See also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813
(Mar. 19, 1990).
114. Id. at 5.
115. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,664. (Feb. 8, 1974).
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courts" and that office expenses were not entitled to the same
treatment. 116 The Service further stated that the precise justification for
excluding political campaign contributions from gross income was never
clearly articulated but that it is clear that the justification "is not that the
contributions are gifts within the context of Code § 102."' 17
In 1974, the Service issued a revenue ruling designed to explain
the tax treatment of political organizations. Revenue Ruling 74-21
involved an organization formed to engage in activities to influence the
nomination and election of individuals to public office."' The
organization sought advice from the Service regarding its tax status, and
the Service determined that the organization "more nearly resemble[d] a
corporation than a trust or partnership and that the tax rules for
corporations appl[ied]." 119 The Service then set out the relevant tax
principles that would apply to the organization.'2 0  It required the
organization to submit a corporate tax return and pay tax at the corporate
tax rate. The Service concluded, however, that campaign contributions
were not includible in gross income and that campaign expenditures were
not deductible. 121
Later, in 1990, the Service was once again faced with the
question of how to tax an exempt organization that lost its tax status.
The General Counsel Memorandum recognized that there had been
confusion regarding the tax treatment but implied that confusion was
only outside the Service. Specifically, the memorandum indicated
"[t]here may have been some confusion outside the Service as to the
basis for not taxing campaign contributions [citing Senate Report
indicating that the basis was gift treatment] . . . . The underlying
rationale was a conduit or 'quasi-trust concept', however, not section
116. Id. at 2 (alteration added).
117. Id. at 3. This statement is incredible in light of the prior history regarding
gift treatment and the fact that the Service's announcement in 1973 indicated that
gift treatment was likely the reason for the exclusion. The statement was necessary,
however, for the Service to be able to distinguish contributions to a candidate from
contributions to a Member of Congress's office.
118. Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14, 15.
119. Id. at 6 (alterations added).
120. Id.
121. Id.
102"' 122 The Service may have been right that a possible alternative
rationale is a quasi-trust concept, but the idea that the Service was
consistent in promoting this rationale is absurd.
There is some support for the Service's quasi-trust view in its
treatment of social clubs. 23 Social clubs are exempt from tax. This
exemption appears to have been granted based on administrative
convenience. It was very difficult to obtain tax forms from these
• • .,.. 124
organizations, and the revenue collected from them was insignificant.
More than thirty years after the exemption was granted, a congressional
report discussing whether investment income of social clubs should be
subject to tax indicated that the decision to exempt social clubs was
justified when the income to the organizations was limited to the receipts
of the membership. 125 The idea was that since the social organization
collected money from members and then spent it on members, the
individual. was in "substantially the same position as if he had spent his
income on pleasure or recreation."126 The quasi-trust rationale may be
logical in the social club context when the payment is being spent for the
benefit of the contributor. It is far more problematic when an
independent organization can spend the funds as it sees fit. 127
'Although the precise justification for excluding political
contributions is unclear, what is clear is that the Service was struggling
with howto treat political organizations for tax purposes. Normative tax
principles were providing neither a simple nor an administrable standard
for how to tax political organizations. In 1975, Congress resolved the
confusion regarding the tax treatment of political organizations and
122. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813, 41 n.32 (Mar. 19, 1990) (alterations
added).
123. See Colinvaux, supra note 60 (making the social club argument).
124. H.R. REP. 922, at 4 (noting the reason for the exemption was
administrative ease). But see Colinvaux, supra note 60, at 532 (indicating that under
general income tax principles contributions to a social club would not be income).
125. S. REP. No. 91-522, at 71 (1969); see also Colinvaux, supra note 60, at
532.
126. Id.
127. Interestingly, the Service rejected this type of quasi-trust rationale in
Communist Party of U.S.A. v. Commissioner, where the Government argued that a
"membership fee" to a political party was taxable, and asserted that all political
parties are taxable associations under the Code. 373 F.2d 682, 683 (1967).
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enacted § 527 of the Code. 128 As enacted in 1975, § 527 provided for a
new type of exempt organization, a political organization, and clarified
that contributions to a political organization were not subject to tax and
• 129
that its expenditures were not deductible from income.
After the passage of § 527, the Service was still occasionally
called upon to determine the tax liability of political organizations when
those organizations did not qualify for tax-exempt status. This mainly
occurred when the Service sought to revoke an organization's tax-
exempt status. If the Service revoked an organization's exemption, then
it needed to determine the tax consequences of that revocation. In those
instances, it appears that the Service has taxed the investment income of
the organization, but has not treated the contributions to the organization
130
as income.
B. Tax Theory-Is there any taxable income anyway?
IGs concerned about increased regulation of tax-exempt entities
may seek an alternative organizational form to avoid these restrictions.
In order to determine the benefits or consequences of forgoing tax-
exempt status, one needs to examine what the tax consequences to an
organization would be if it forewent tax-exempt status. In my view, if
the current provisions in the Code were applied correctly, in most cases
there would be significant financial ramifications to an IG that chooses to
128. Upholstery Regulators Act, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 10(a), 88 Stat. 2108,
2116 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 527 (2002)).
129. I.R.C. §§ 527(a), (c) (1975); see also S. REP. No. 93-1357 (1974).
130. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813 at 2208 (finding the contributions
were gifts); Christian Coalition Intern. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 2d 437, 439
(E.D. Va. 2001) (involving tax dispute of $198; the amount clearly would be more if
contributions were considered income); Democratic Leadership Council v. United
States, No: 1:05-cv-1067 (JGP) (suing for refund of tax paid on investment income
by the DLC in a suit contesting the Service's decision to revoke its tax-exempt
status); Democratic Leadership Council, Inc. v. United States, No: 1:05-cv-01067
(JGP), Plaintiff s Statement of Material Facts 68-70 (indicating deficiencies in the
amount of $3,839, $5,264, $5,510.24, and $6,985.82). The notice of deficiency in
the DLC case also indicates that the Service did not include in taxable income
contributions to the DLC, Notice of Deficiency, on file with the author. See also
supra note 102.
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organize as a taxable entity. There may, however, be creative ways that
an IG can ameliorate some of these consequences.
In determining whether an IG organized as a taxable entity
would incur significant tax liability there are two possible incidences of
taxation. First, the IG receives contributions or payments from third
parties. If these payments constitute income, the IG will have significant
tax liability, and it will pay a hefty price for forgoing tax-exempt
status.13' Second, if the contributions to IGs are not considered income
because they are gifts, then there is the possibility that those
contributions will be subject to gift tax. If donors to a taxable IG are
subject to gift tax of up to 45 percent on their contributions, IGs will
have a difficult time raising funds from large donors.
1. Payments received by a taxable IG may be income for tax purposes
Gross income under § 61 of the Code is defined broadly as
"income from whatever source derived. ' ' 132  Under this expansive
definition, absent another provision of the Code, payments to a taxable
IG would be income. There are several tax theories, however, including
a conduit theory (which incorporates the pooling and quasi-trust
rationale), a capital contribution theory, and a gift theory, that could
potentially be used to argue that payments received by taxable IGs
should not constitute income to the organizations.
a. Conduit theory
One of the theories that the Service presumably relied upon to
exclude contributions from income prior to the passage of § 527 was a
conduit theory. Under the conduit theory approach, the payments to IGs
are not considered income because the organizations are merely acting as
131. One argument is that the contributions to the IG would be income but that
the expenses of the IG would be deductible business expenses of the organization.
Section 162(e) of the Code prohibits entities from deducting from income amounts
spent on political advocacy. Thus, if the contributions were considered income to
the IG, the IG would have to pay tax on the contributions without a commensurate
deduction for the IG's expenses (at least those expenses related to political
advocacy).
132. I.R.C. § 61 (West 2006).
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conduits for spending that a taxpayer could have made by herself.
Although the Service never explained what the theory is, it is likely
based on either a pooling or a trust rationale. These two rationales are
often conflated by the courts, and in some instances both theories may
apply. People may pool resources and the organization holding the
money may have a trust obligation to the contributors. But it also
appears that each theory may stand on its own. I consider them
separately because they are supported by slightly different rationales.
Under the pooling theory, when individuals make post-tax
payments to a political organization, the political organization is viewed
merely as the collector of the individual payments. 133 As such, the
payment would be no different than if the individuals themselves each
made part of the payment for the specific political activity at issue.
Clearly ten people could each pay for 1/10th the cost of a political
advertisement without any entity (besides the television station) being
involved or taxed. If an IG acted merely as the means of pooling money,
then there would be no basis for taxing the entity.
Professor Gregg Polsky and Guy-Uriel E. Charles argue that the
• . 134
pooling theory should apply to contributions to political organizations.
They use the example of neighbors pooling money to build a fence in the
neighborhood. They correctly conclude that the neighbors would not
have to pay tax on the pooled funds. 135  They then argue that
contributions to political organizations are similar to the fence building
example and therefore should not be taxed. 136
Proponents of the pooling theory also point to the Service's
treatment of social clubs as a justification for not taxing political
137
organizations. Prior to the statutory exemption for social clubs, the
133. Daniel L. Simmons, An Essay on Federal Income Taxation and
Campaign Finance Reform, 54 FLA. L. REv. 1, 98 (2002) (arguing that these
payments may not be gifts, but instead are purchases of services with value equal to
contributions).
134. Polsky & Charles, supra note 7, at 1015-1016.
135. Id.
136. Id. My disagreement with Polsky and Charles is more in degree than
theory. I agree that the the entity used to pool funds to build a fence would not be
taxable. But IGs are very sophisticated organizations with significant entity-level
activity. They are simply involved in too much independent activity to be seen as
organizations that merely pool funds.
137. Colinvaux, supra note 60, at 532.
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Service determined that it would not require social clubs to file returns.
The original basis for that determination appears to be administrative
ease.13 9  Later explanations justify the exemption based on a conduit
theory. 140 The Joint Committee justified the exemption on the grounds
that "the organization merely facilitates a joint activity of its
members."' 14 1 Congress, in considering further changes to the taxation of
social clubs in 1969, indicated that "the tax exemption operates properly
only when the sources of income of the organization are limited to
receipts from the membership. Under such circumstances, the individual
is in substantially the same position as if he had spent this income in
pleasure or recreation (or other benefits) without the intervening separate
• • ,142
organization."
Moreover, in a series of cases involving the pooling of funds for
advertising expenses, the courts have held that pooled funds are not
necessarily income to the entity that aggregates those funds. The specific
rationale for not taxing those contributions was the trust theory discussed
infra, but in those cases the courts recognized that the distributors were
merely pooling funds to engage in advertising. 143 Central to the holdings
in those cases was the fact that the contributors exercised significant
involvement in the activities of the entity that received the pooled
138. H.R. REP. No. 922, at 4 (1916).
139. Id.
140. Colinvaux, supra note 60, at 532; S. REP. No. 91-552, at 71 (1969).
141. Historical Organization Development and Present Law of the Federal Tax
Exemption for Charities and Other Tax Exempt Organizations, J. Comm. on
Taxation, 109th Cong., JCX-29-05, 28 (2005).
142. S. REP. No. 91-522, at 71 (1969).
143. See e.g., Affiliated Foods, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 154 F.3d
527, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1998); Florists' Transworld Delivery Ass'n v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 67 T.C. 333, 345-55 (1976); Ford Dealers Adver. Fund, Inc.,
Jacksonville Div. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 55 T.C. 761, 771-72 (1971); Dri-
Powr Distrib. Ass'n Trust v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 54 T.C. 460, 479 (1970);
Angelus Funeral Home v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 47 T.C. 391, 396-97 (1967),
reh'g denied 407 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1969); Broad. Measurement Bureau v. Comm'r
of Internal Revenue, 16 T.C. 988, 1001 (1951); The Seven-Up Co. v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 14 T.C. 965, 978 (1950).
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funds. 144 The Service, however, has not acquiesced in this treatment and
rejects the pooling theory even in these cases.145
Thus we can see a model for the type of activity that might
qualify as merely a pooling of money. These are activities taking the
place of what individuals could do on their own if they joined together as
a group. In the fence example used by Professors Polsky and Charles,
the entity itself is just created to pool the money. The neighbors have
decided upon the project, and the person or people who control the entity
serve only an administrative function. In the joint advertising example
above, the various distributors could have joined together and each
written a check to the advertising company for a portion of the
advertisement. The creation of an association to do so made it easier for
the parties to pool their money. The organization itself had no real
function but to act as a conduit for the contributors.
In the context of taxable IGs, however, the pooling theory does
not work. Unlike neighbors joining together to build a fence, IGs are not
merely pooling funds to complete a specific project in an agreed upon
way. Similarly, IGs are not like social clubs. Social clubs are run for the
benefit of the members, and the contribution is much more like an
individual consumption decision. Presumably, the member gets the
benefit of his dues in the form of benefits offered by the club. IGs do not
have members and are not run for the benefit of their members. Nor are
IGs similar to advertising associations where the contributors exercise
significant control over how the money is spent.
Instead, IGs are independent groups that seek to influence
elections through a wide range of activities. Donors do not have a voice
in the organization. There is no board charged with making sure that
activities are undertaken for the benefit of those who have contributed
money. Donors lose control over their money as soon as they contribute
it to the organization. In fact, political organizations often promote more
than one issue or candidate. An individual may contribute money even
though she only supports some of the organization's activities.
144. Dri Power Distrib., 54 T.C. at 476-77.
145. Rev. Rul. 74-318, 1974-2 CB 13 (rejecting pooling theory and finding the




It may be that an IG could organize in a way that satisfies the
pooling theory. A group of neighbors with a common goal could join
together to run political commercials. But in the large majority of cases,
IGs are not designed to be conduits for the pooling of resources, and
instead are individual organizations with individual plans and goals.
They seek contributors who agree with those goals, but they are not
designed to be responsible to the contributors. 146
The pooling theory may have been one of the factors that the
Service originally considered in not subjecting political parties and
candidates to tax. The weakness of that theory may also have been the
reason Congress chose to codify the tax treatment of exempt political
organizations under § 527.
Implicit in the pooling theory is the idea that the organization
receiving the funds is not the true owner of the funds. They are pooled
funds and each contributor is the true owner. It is unclear if this trust
requirement is a component of the pooling theory or stands on its own as
an independent justification. I have, however, analyzed it here as another
theory supporting a conduit approach. The trust theory is similar to the
pooling theory in that it claims the organization is not the true owner of
the funds and is merely acting in the contributor's stead. It relies on the
view that payments to an IG can be seen as contributions that the payor
expects will be used in a certain manner on her behalf.147 The payments
would then be held in "trust" in a way that limits the organization's use
of the funds. 148 In that context, the organization would be expending
funds for the payor at her discretion so the payment would remain hers
and would not constitute income to the political organization.
Presumably, this is different from the pooling justification because the
trust theory does not require a pooling of funds or any type of equal
contribution. This is based less on the idea of a joint enterprise and more
146. As the district court noted in National Federation of Republican
Assemblies (NFRA), political organizations are not required to give the money back
to contributors upon dissolution. Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United
States, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1282 (S.D. Ala. 2001). See also Nat'l Fed'n of
Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1308 n.7. (S.D. Ala.
2002).
147. NFRA, 148 F. Supp. At 1282.
148. Id.
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on the idea that the person receiving the contribution has an obligation to
spend the money in a specific way.
The trust justification has been applied in the for-profit context
with regard to telethons and in the advertising context discussed supra.
Thus, when a television studio receives contributions as part of a telethon
and aggregates those contributions and passes them on to the charity, the
contributions are not considered income to the television station because
the station is acting in trust on behalf of the contributors. 49 Similarly,
when a group of distributors joined together to create a joint advertising
program, and money contributed but not spent in the joint program was
returned to the participants, the courts have held that the entity is not
taxable on the funds but instead holds them in trust for the contributor.
150
Interestingly, the mere determination that something is a trust does not
really answer the question. Trusts may be taxed on income that is not
distributed, and it is possible that expenditures on political advertising
will not be considered a distribution by the trust.15
Just as with the pooling theory, the trust rationale fails as a
justification for excluding contributions to an IG from the gross income.
IGs are under no obligation to spend contributors' money in any specific
fashion. They are not merely holding the money and passing it along to
another party, and the money is not designated for a specific purpose.
They are not acting as agents for contributors but instead are seeking
contributions to support the missions of the organizations. Once given, it
is the IG that has dominion and control over the funds, and it may spend
them in any manner it sees fit, consistent with its organizational152
purpose. The Service has concluded that conduit treatment is
appropriate only when the organization is clearly functioning as an agent
149. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813 at 209 n.34 (Mar. 20, 1990).
150. See supra note 143.
151. I.R.C. §§ 665, 666 (West 2006).
152. Simmons, supra note 1333, at 98-99; Rev. Rul. 75-146, 1975-1 C.B. 23
(rejecting conduit treatment when contributions made to Congressman to fund intern
program stating that "[t]o claim that one is merely a conduit while at the same time
enjoying all of the fruits of the involved transaction is anomalous" (quoting




for the donor and is not the true owner of the funds.153 In most cases,
however, IGs are engaged in too much activity to be seen as mere
conduits for taxpayers' contributions.
b. Capital contribution theory
Another possible tax theory that would provide that contributions
to an IG were not taxable income to the IG is that the payments are
actually contributions of capital to the organization. Under existing law,
contributions of capital are not usually included in the gross income of a
taxable entity.' 54 Thus if the payment to the IG is considered a capital
contribution, the IG would not have taxable income on the payment
when it is received.
There are three problems with the capital contribution theory.
First, except in extraordinary circumstances that do not apply here,
payments will not be considered contributions to capital unless the
contributor receives some type of capital interest in the entity in return
for the payment. Second, if the contributor does receive some type of
interest, then that interest must be real, which may have tax implications
for the contributor and may impact the way in which the IG is required to
operate. Third, even if the theory works, the result is that the
contributions are not considered income to the IG, but the contributions
may still be considered gifts for gift tax purposes.
Determining whether the payment is a contribution to capital is
difficult in the IG context because the law anticipates a payment to a for-
profit corporation. We can, however, extrapolate from decisions dealing
with for-profit businesses, and apply the for-profit model in this
153. The Service has examined the conduit theory in the context of a charitable
organization that lost its exempt status and concluded that the conduit theory does
not justify excluding contributions from gross income. The Service said that since
public charities exercise considerable discretion and control of the contributed funds,
they are not merely conduits for the payments. The Service concluded that charities
exercise more than ministerial power over donated funds and that the donations,
once made, are controlled by the charities, not the donor. The Service has concluded
that the conduit theory is reserved for situations in which the organization is clearly
an agent, and not the "true owner" of the funds. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,813 (Mar. 19, 1990).
154. I.R.C. § 118(a) (West 2006) (corporations); I.R.C. § 721(a) (2000)
(partnerships).
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context. 155 Generally, a payment will not be considered a contribution to
capital unless the person making the payment receives some capital
interest in the entity. There are some very exceptional instances,
however, when something can be considered a capital contribution even
if the contributor has not received an interest in the entity.
The Court has set out a five-part test for determining whether a
payment by a nonshareholder is a contribution to capital. 156 In order for
a payment by a nonshareholder to be considered a contribution to capital
it must: (1) become a permanent part of the transferee's working capital
structure; (2) not be compensation, such as a direct payment for a
specific, quantifiable service provided for the transferor by the
transferee; (3) be bargained for; (4) result in benefit to the transferee in
an amount commensurate with its value; and (5) the asset ordinarily, if
not always, will be employed in or contribute to the production of
additional income and its value assured in that respect.
1 57
155. See Brown Shoe Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 339 U.S. 583, 588-
89 (1950) (holding that payment by community groups to corporation as an
inducement to locate or expand in their communities was a capital contribution);
Edwards v. Cuba R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 628, 632 (1925) (holding that payment by the
Cuban Government to a railroad to promote construction in Cuba was a contribution
to capital). But see United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412
U.S. 401, 413 (1973) (holding that facilities constructed for public safety at
government expense and giving to private company was a subsidy and not a
contribution to capital); Detroit Edison Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 319 U.S.
98, 102-03 (1943) (holding that payments by customers to a utility for the cost of
building power lines was not a contribution to capital).
156. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. at 413. The Court first
held that payments by nonshareholders could be contributions to capital in Cuba
R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 628 (1925). The test in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co.
clarified the Court's holding in Cuba R.R. and applied a five-part test. It is
questionable whether the Court was correct in Cuba R.R. in treating payments by
communities to a corporation as contributions to capital. See Thomas L. Evans, The
Taxation of Nonshareholder Contributions to Capital: An Economic Analysis, 45
VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1459 n.5 (1992). The Service's position is that in light of
intervening case law, payments by communities to corporations are generally not
contributions to capital. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,354 (Dec. 21, 1977) (tracing
history of nonshareholder contributions to capital.); see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,813 at 210-11 (Mar. 20 1990) (applying a five-part test and determining
contributions were not contributions to capital).
157. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. at 413; See also 10
JACOB MERTENS, Jr., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3829 (2007).
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Under this test, payments made to IGs do not qualify as
contributions to capital. The payments are not a permanent part of the
organization's working capital structure. They are received by the
organization and expended on political advocacy. They are not retained
by the organization to enhance its capital structure. Moreover, the
payments are, in some sense, compensation for services. As previously
discussed, the IG performs a service for the person who makes the
payment.158  The IG engages in political advocacy. It is not much
different than if the person had hired a political consultant to produce a
political advertisement. The payment to the consultant would clearly be
income to the consultant. In addition, the payments are not bargained
for, and they do not contribute to the production of income for the
organization.
The five-part test discussed above applies when a
nonshareholder makes a contribution to capital. An IG, however, might
be set up to allow contributors to pay money and receive some type of
capital interest in exchange for their payment. If these capital interests
had substance, then they would likely be recognized for tax purposes. If
the contributions were recognized for tax purposes then the capital
contributions would likely not be income to the IG.
Although it would be difficult for a contribution to an IG to be
characterized as a contribution to capital of the IG, it is not impossible.
The IG could provide shares, partnership interests, or membership
interests to the contributors in exchange for the contributions. The
contributor's interest could include an interest in the assets of the entity
upon dissolution, a voting interest, or even an interest in the profits of the
organization.
159
158. Simmons, supra note 133, at 98.
159. There are potential securities law implications depending on how the IG
sets up its affairs. If contributors are passive and there is some type of profit interest
in the membership interest, federal and state laws may deem the interests to be
securities. If they are deemed to be securities, the interest will be subject to
significant regulation. See Nutek Info. Sys. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 977 P.2d 826
(Ariz. 1999) (finding an LLC membership interest to be a security); S.E.C. v.
Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Corp., 991 F.Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997) (finding an
LLC membership interest to be a security); SEC v. Vision Commc'n Inc., No. 94-
065, 1994 SEC LEXIS 1409, at *4-5 (D.D.C. May 11, 1994) (issuing a permanent
injunction barring promoters from selling membership interests because those
interests were subject to securities laws). See also THOMAS A. HUMPHREYS,
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If the contributions to the IG were treated as contributions to
capital, then the contributions would not be treated as taxable income to
the IG. There are, however, serious drawbacks in providing a capital
interest in exchange for the contribution. First, the IG must give up
something of value. This might be some control of the organization by,
for example, providing large contributors with voting rights, or it might
be that contributors had some right to the assets of the entity upon
dissolution. The creators of the IG might therefore have to relinquish
some of their power and control of the IG.
Treating contributions to the IG as contributions to the IG's
capital also might have serious implications for contributors. If the IG is
organized as a partnership or an LLC, a contributor would be subject to
tax on her share of the income generated by the IG. Moreover, the
conclusion that a payment is contribution to capital only answers the
question whether the contribution to the IG is income to the IG. The
contributor may still be subject to gift tax on the contribution since the
contributor may not have received money or money's worth for the
contribution. 160
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES & LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS § 9.02 (Law
Journal Press 2007) (1998) (thoroughly discussing various issues surrounding the
treatment of membership interests as securities). This issue has been debated in
academic circles and is outside the scope of this project, see Carol R. Goforth, Why
Limited Liability Company Membership Interests Should Not Be Treated as
Securities and Possible Steps to Encourage this Result, 45 HASTING L.J. 1223, 1278-
91 (1994) (arguing LLC membership interests should not be treated as securities);
Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19 PEPP. L.
REv. 1069, 1095-1102 (1992) (holding LLC membership interests should not be
treated as securities); Marc I. Steinberg and Karen L. Conway, The Limited Liability
Company as a Security, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1105, 1119-22 (1992) (arguing that in
many cases, LLC interests should be treated as securities). The decision whether to
treat an LLC interest as a security usually turns on the passive nature of the
member's investment and the potential profit from the investment. In this case, the
IG could design the membership interest so it clearly was not an investment.
Moreover, it could provide significant voting rights to the members and provide
members with hiring and/or oversight authority to increase the likelihood that
members would be considered active participants.
160. See I.R.C. § 2512(b) (West 2006) (valuation of gifts); Treas. Reg. §
25.2512-8 (2006) (the value of property transferred by donor which exceeds the
value of money or money's worth given for the transfer is reached by the gift tax).




While the conduit and contribution-to-capital theories do not, in
most instances, provide sufficient reasons for excluding payments to a
taxable IG, as discussed previously, neither theory appears to be the
original basis for the Service's determination that payments to a political
organization are not income. It appears from the history behind the
Service's issuance of Revenue Rule 74-21 (indicating that contributions
to a political organization would not be considered income) that the
Service believed that contributions to political organizations were gifts
and therefore were not considered income.'
61
There are two substantive tax issues here. The first is whether
the contributions may be excluded from the IG's income as gifts, and the
second is whether the contributors are subject to gift tax on the
contributions. The standards used to determine a gift for income tax and
gift tax purposes are not the same. A gift for income tax purposes is one
that is given with detached and disinterested generosity, while the test for
a gift for gift tax purposes is whether the payment was given for money
or money's worth. 162 Thus, it is possible that a payment may be a gift for
income tax purposes and not for gift tax purposes. However, a
determination that a payment was made with detached and disinterested
generosity makes it likely that a court will conclude that a payment was
organizations are not subject to gift tax because they are bona fide, arms-length
transactions and free from donative intent. See supra note 72.
161. See Tax Treatment of Contributions of Appreciated Property to
Committees of Political Parties, supra note 95 (indicating that it is a matter of
history that the Service has never required political committees to file income tax
returns because it believed that virtually all of the receipts were from gifts);
Announcement 73-84, 1973-2 C.B. 461 (reversing previous position and requiring
political parties to file returns and indicating that gross income will include interest
and dividends but not contributions). But see Regan v. Taxation with
Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1997) (indicating the Service based its decision
on the conduit theory and not the gift theory).
162. Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960)
(holding that gift for income tax purposes is a payment made with "detached and
disinterested generosity"); I.R.C. § 2512(b) (2006) (gift when property transferred
for less than adequate consideration in money or money's worth); Treas. Reg. §
25.2512-8 (2006) (gift when "value of property transferred by the donor exceeds the
value in money or money's worth of the consideration given").
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not made for money or money's worth. Thus while the determination
that a payment is a gift would benefit the IG by excluding it from
income, it also may make it more difficult for the IG to obtain
contributions because contributors might fear the gift tax consequences
of making large contributions.163
Section 102 of the Code provides that gifts are not included in
the income of the recipient. Thus if contributions are gifts within the
meaning of § 102, then contributions to an IG would not be included in
income. In determining whether a payment should be included in
income or whether it is a gift for income tax purposes the test is whether
164
the payment was given with detached and disinterested generosity.
Moreover, in reaching this conclusion, courts will primarily look to the
donor's intent in making the payment. The problem for the IG in making
the argument that contributions are not included in income because they
are gifts is that it increases the chances that the contributor would be
subject to gift tax on the contribution.
Contributions to IGs appear to meet the classic definition of gift.
They are given to the IG without the expectation of something in return
and to further the general ideals and principles of the IG. Contributors
do get some type of intangible benefit from their contributions or they
would not make them, but in other circumstances the Service has
consistently not considered these types of intangible benefits in
determining whether a contribution was a gift and therefore deductible
under § 170 of the Code. In the charitable context, a person makes a
contribution to a charity because she believes in the mission of the
charity and wants to support that mission. A cancer survivor can give to
the American Cancer Society even though the contribution may not be
completely detached, and a parishioner can make a contribution to a
church even if she receives some religious enlightenment from the
religious institution.1
61
163. The Code provides that the first $12,000 given to a person or entity is not
subject to gift tax. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 2006).
164. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285 (1960).
165. The Service has reached the same conclusion in a similar hypothetical
situation. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6812121000A (Dec. 12, 1968) ("To illustrate,
when an exempt organization like the Cancer Fund receives a voluntary contribution
... the Service would not argue that this contribution was anything but a voluntary
payment of something for nothing .... ).
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Moreover, charities routinely honor donors by naming
institutions, buildings, or programs after the donors. The intangible
benefits to donors and their families have not been sufficient to defeat
gift treatment.166 Thus, the mere fact that one makes a contribution to an
IG does not necessarily mean that he did so without detached and
disinterested generosity. The contributor hopes to promote the
organization's goals, but that is really no different than the motivation for
most gifts to charities. In fact, the Service recognized that general
support for the goals of an organization will not exclude gift treatment.167
There is, however, support for the contrary notion that
contributions to political organizations are not gifts because the payor to
a political organization receives a benefit in exchange for the payment.
This conclusion is supported by cases rejecting the Service's position
that payments to political organizations are gifts subject to the gift tax.
68
In Stern v. United States,169 Mrs. Stem, a wealthy investor, believed that
166. Generally the "detached and disinterested test used to determine whether
something is a gift under § 102 is the same standard used for determining whether
something is a deductible gift under § 170. To be deductible under § 170, a gift
must also be to a qualifying organization." De Jong v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue,
309 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1962) (using § 102 standard to determine whether a
deduction was proper under § 170). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6812121000A
(Dec. 12, 1968) (finding contributions to § 501(c)(3)s made during period that
exempt status was revoked were not income to the (c)(3) because such a contribution
was a gift).
167. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6812121000A (Dec. 12, 1968). Charities
routinely provide naming right in exchange for contributions and these naming rights
have not been held to defeat gift treatment. See Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104,
107 (1968) ("Such privileges as being associated with or being known as a
benefactor of the organization are not significant return benefits that have a
monetary value."); Treas. Reg. 53.4941(d)-2(f)(2) (naming rights only an incidental
or tenuous benefit for purposes of determining self-dealing in the private foundation
context).
168. Stern v. United States, 436 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir. 1971); see also
Carson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 641 F.2d 864, 866 (10th Cir. 1981)
(payment was for donor's own economic advantage and campaign contributions are
not gifts within the meaning of the gift tax law); Jeffrey Schoenblum, The Changing
Meaning of "Gift": An Analysis of the Tax Court's Decision in Carson v.
Commissioner, 32 VAND. L. REv. 641, 653-54 (1979) (political contributions should
not be treated as gifts arguing that taxation of political contribution is unrelated to
the purpose of the gift tax).
169. 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971).
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political corruption in Louisiana was hurting Louisiana's business
reputation. She made large political expenditures and pooled her money
with that of other like-minded individuals. The Service argued that the
contributions were gifts subject to gift tax. The court found that the
political expenditures were made in the ordinary course of business, were
designed to protect her business interests, and were free of donative
intent.170 Specifically, the court found
[t]he contributions were motivated by [Stem's]
desire to promote a slate of candidates that would
protect and advance her personal and property
interests .... In a very real sense, then, Mrs. Stem
was making an economic investment that she
believed would have a direct and favorable effect
upon her property holdings and business
interests .... 171
While this holding relieved Mrs. Stem of gift tax liability, it may have
subjected the receiving organization to income tax. If the payment was
made in the ordinary course of business without donative intent then the
payment should be considered income to the association since it was not
made with detached and disinterested generosity.
Under Stern those payments to IGs that were made in the
ordinary course of business or for financial reasons would not be
considered gifts and would be income to the IGs. The problem with
applying the Stern logic broadly to payments to political organizations is
that Stem's success turned on the specific facts of her case. It is not clear
that most contributors to IGs are doing so in the ordinary course of
business with the hope of receiving a financial benefit.
Moreover, outside the political candidate context, the Service has
generally opposed gift treatment for contributions in analogous
situations, and the Service has, at times, taken a very strict reading of the
detached and disinterested generosity test. For example, in a case
involving contributions to defray officeholders' costs in conducting
official activities, the Service ruled that contributions were not made
with detached and disinterested generosity.'7 2  The Service concluded
170. Id. at 1329.
171. Id. at 1330 (alterations added).
172. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35664 (Feb. 8, 1974).
that because the contributions made the officeholder more effective and
better able to serve his constituents, contributions from constituents were
not made with detached and disinterested generosity.173  The Service
reached a similar conclusion with regard to contributions made to174anofietaeofamm r
support a Congressional intern program and office travel of a member
of Congress and his staff. 175
Although the Service initially took a hard line in this area, its
positions regarding the intern program and member travel were not
litigated. It is doubtful, based on the Service's position with regard to
intangible benefits not defeating gift treatment under § 170 that the
Service's prior positions would hold up in court. In fact, there is
evidence that the Service would not treat such tenuous connections as
defeating the detached and disinterested generosity standard.
176
Therefore it is very possible that contributions to a taxable IG
would be gifts and not income to the IG. This would resolve most of the
IG's tax problems and would be far simpler than trying to cast the
contributions as contributions to capital. A determination that the
173. Id.
174. Rev. Rul. 75-146, 1975-1 C.B. 23 ("[D]onors contribute to the intern fund
with the intention of obtaining a more efficient public servant by supporting the
intern program. Therefore, the contributions are not made with an incentive of
detached and disinterested generosity and do not qualify as gifts .... (alteration
added)).
175. Rev. Rul. 76-276, 1976-2 C.B. 14 ("In this case, the contributions enable
the Member of Congress to become more accessible to constituents which, in turn,
provides constituents with the opportunity of obtaining more effective representation
in Congress.").
176. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813 (March 20, 1990); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
6812121000A (Dec. 12, 1968) (A transferor's general intent that the organization's
objectives be furthered is not inconsistent with "the spirit of 'detached and
disinterested generosity. . . .' If it were true that the presence of a motive to
accomplish certain general objectives would rule out a finding of gift, then taxpayers
could never claim a deduction under section 170 . . ., since taxpayers when making
contributions, invariably seek to accomplish some objective .... "). In addition,
when the Service revokes an organization's tax-exempt status, the Service does not
appear to treat contributions to the taxable entity as income to the organization. See
supra note 130 discussing DLC and Christian Coalition.
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contributions are gifts for income tax purposes, however, increases the
likelihood that they will be taxed as gifts under the gift tax.
177
2. Gift tax
Gift tax is owed on gift transfers that are in excess of $12,000
annually. 178 The standard for determining whether a contribution is a gift
for gift tax purposes is whether the transfer was made for "money or
money's worth."' 179 The main justification for treating payments to IGs
as gifts for income tax purposes is that they are made with detached and
disinterested generosity, and the payor receives no tangible benefit in
return for the payment. If the payments are treated as gifts for income
tax purposes based on that reasoning, it would also appear that the payor
did not receive money or money's worth for the contribution.
1 80
The Service has consistently taken the position that payments to
IGs are subject to gift tax unless there is a specific statutory provision to
the contrary. 181  The government's theory presumably is that the
177. Because there are different standards for gifts under each provision,
however, there is a slight chance that the contributions could be considered gifts for
income tax purposes and not gifts for gift tax purposes.
178. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 2006) (statute exempts $10,000 for gift tax
and then adjusts that amount for inflation); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in
1992) (gift when "value of property transferred [by the donor] exceeds the value in
money or money's worth of the consideration given" (alteration added)). Under
current law, taxpayers are entitled to a $1,000,000 gift tax credit. Thus a person can
give up to $1,000,000 during his lifetime without having to pay gift tax. I.R.C. §
2505 (West 2006). A taxpayer, however, must file a tax return with the Service
indicating that the gift should not be taxed. The gift amount is then subtracted from
the amount of credit available for a taxpayer's estate. The law in this area, however,
is in flux as the estate tax is repealed in 2010 and reinstated in 2011. See Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901(b)
115 Stat. 38, 150 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
179. See I.R.C. § 2512(b) (West 2006); Treas. Reg. 25.2512-8 (as amended in
1992).
180. I.R.C. § 2512(b) (West 2006).
181. See Rev. Rul. 59-57, 1959-1 C.B. 626 (contribution made to a political
party or candidate is subject to gift tax); I.R.S. Tech. Info. Rel. 1125 (Dec. 17, 1971)
(noting that the Service would only follow Stern in the Fifth Circuit and that "[i]t is
the view of the Service that political campaign contributions are taxable gifts
irrespective of the subjective intent of the taxpayer." (alteration added)); Rev. Rul.
72-355, 1972-2 C.B. 532 ("Since the enactment of the present gift tax in 1932, it has
contributions were made without the donors' receiving anything of value
in return for the contribution. 82 This conclusion makes sense if the
payment is treated as a gift for income tax purposes. It is, however, hard
to reconcile the Service's position in the gift tax context with its position
in the income tax context. In the gift tax context the Service argues that
the payment is a gift because it is not made for "money or money's
worth." It argues that the "donor's own social, political or charitable
goals" are insufficient to provide the necessary "money's worth" for the
exchange.183 In the income tax context, however, the Service argues that
these "goals" are sufficient to defeat gift treatment and even tenuous
benefits like the fact that a member of Congress may be more efficient
and better able to serve his constituents will prevent gift treatment. In
my view, in these instances the tests in both the income and gift tax
context turn on the same basic facts, and a payment should either be a
gift for both income and estate tax purposes or for neither.
Some practitioners have successfully argued that contributions to
political and social welfare organizations are not gifts, and Barbara
Rhomberg has written a thorough analysis of potential gift tax
consequences for contributions to social welfare organizations.184 These
arguments, however, are generally premised on the fact that the
contributions are arms-length transactions without donative intent.
Clearly a donor that lacked donative intent for gift tax purposes would
been the position of the Internal Revenue Service that contributions to a political
campaign are taxable transfers for purposes of the gift tax .. "); Announcement 73-
84, 1973-2 C.B. 461; Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220 ("The Service continues to
maintain that gratuitous transfers to persons other than organizations described in
section 527(e) of the Code are subject to the gift tax absent any specific statute to the
contrary, even though the transfers may be motivated by a desire to advance the
donor's own social, political or charitable goals.").
182. See e.g., Faulkner v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 875 (1940) (contribution to
women's health organization subject to gift tax), rev'd on other grounds, 112 F.2d
987 (1st Cir. 1940) (finding organization a charitable organization so payments to it
were not subject to gift tax); DuPont v. U.S., 97 F. Supp. 944 (D. Del 1951) (finding
contribution to the "national economic council" subject to gift tax even though
plaintiff believed that he would benefit from the improved economic policies
promoted by the council); Blaine v. Comm'r, 22 T.C. 1195 (1954) (contributions to
social welfare organization were subject to gift tax).
183. Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220.
184. See supra note 72.
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also lack donative intent for income tax purposes. In other words, the
main argument necessary to avoid gift tax treatment also prevents the
donation from being a gift for income tax purposes.
The basic argument is that for determining whether something
was given for "money or money's worth" the Treasury Regulations
provide that a transfer of property "made in the ordinary course of
business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from
any donative intent), will be considered as made for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth."' 85  The purpose of this
regulation appears to be that the Service will not look behind regular
business-type transactions to determine whether there was a fair deal.
Practitioners have argued, however, that "a transaction which is bona
fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent" in the Treasury
Regulation applies even outside of the business context and defines what
will be considered ordinary course of business.186 They claim that the
parenthetical "(a transaction that is bona fide, at arm's length, and free
from any donative intent)" after the words "course of business" in the
regulation defines what course of business must mean.1 87 Thus, they
argue that if they can show that a transaction is bona fide, at arm's
length, and free from any donative intent they do not need to show that it
was in the ordinary course of business. 88
This argument stretches the basic purposes of the ordinary
course of business exception to the gift tax rules pretty far. The point of
the regulations is that if something is given without receiving fair value
in exchange it should be a gift for gift tax purposes. In most cases, a
bona fide, arm's length transaction, free of donative intent will solve that
problem.189 But inherent in the test are two important assumptions: (1)
that there is a transaction and that something is being exchanged for
185. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992).
186. See supra note 72.
187. Rhomberg, supra note 72.
188. Id.
189. Rhomberg points out that the Service has applied the standard outside the
business context to property transferred in a divorce. Id. at 70. The divorce situation
is still similar to a business transaction. The parties are bargaining, and we have
some confidence that the bargain will produce an even exchange. There is no




something else based on some market valuation, and (2) that the
transaction is free of donative intent. Here, contributions to IGs are not
bargained-for exchanges where arm's-length bargaining provides a basis
for respecting the transaction. Thus, even if the commentators are
correct, and the test does apply outside the business context when there is
no market-type exchange, it is still hard to argue that contributions to IGs
are free of donative intent.19° Instead, they are contributions to an
organization because someone supports the goals of the organization.
Moreover, if in fact the commentators are correct and these are
transactions then there is no basis to exclude those transactions from a
taxable IG's income.'
91
The better rule is to treat these contributions as what they are-
gifts. They are given to an organization to support its mission and not
for pecuniary benefit. The intangible benefits that someone receives in
exchange for his contribution are simply too tenuous to defeat gift
treatment for either income tax or gift tax purposes. Moreover, a
determination that these intangible benefits might be sufficient would be
administratively untenable as each case would have to be considered on
its own facts.
This view of normative tax rules, however, provides some
possibilities for IGs organizing as taxable organizations. An IG that
relies on contributions under $12,000 could successfully argue that the
contributions it received were gifts, without contributors to the
organization having to pay gift tax since gifts of $12,000 and below are
not subject to gift tax. Thus, for a small group of IGs the gift strategy
may work. Interestingly, the $12,000 gift tax limit would act as a type of
contribution limitation since contributors would not likely be interested
in paying gift tax on the amount over $12,000.
190. Carson was grounded on different reasoning. Carson merely stated that
campaign contributions, when considered in light of the purposes behind the gift tax,
are simply not gifts. 641 F.2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 1981). This argument would not be
applicable in the context of taxable organizations.
191. This is not a problem when the organization is tax-exempt because it
would not be taxed on the contribution in any event. It does, however, pose serious
problems if the organization is not tax-exempt.
2007]
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
IV. TAXABLE INTEREST GROUPS
If Congress further regulates tax-exempt organizations, IGs will
increasingly examine whether the benefits of tax-exempt status are worth
the costs. As these groups explore the use of taxable entities, my view is
that these groups will ultimately turn to taxable limited-liability
companies (LLCs) or to taxable corporations. The attractiveness of
taxable corporations will depend upon whether the Congress reacts to the
recent decision by the Court in WRTL and places further regulations on
corporations, and to what degree IGs are trying to avoid the corporate
restrictions that currently exist. LLCs, however, have the potential to
allow an organization to meet all four criteria (limited tax liability,
limited liability, anonymity, limited regulation of speech) set out in Part
II. This part examines how the normative tax rules discussed in Parts II
and III would play out in the context of a taxable LLC and concludes that
in most cases there will be significant financial consequences if an IG
organizes as a taxable organization.
Limited liability companies can elect to be taxed as
• . 192
partnerships. If they chose to do so, FEC regulations provide that the
organizations' choice for tax purposes will also control their treatment
under federal election laws. 193 Thus, if an LLC chooses to be taxed as a
partnership, the election law regulations restricting the political activities
of corporations will not apply.
This section takes a brief look at how one could form a taxable
LLC that would engage in political advocacy. 194 First, as discussed
earlier, taxable IGs would still be subject to general campaign-finance
regulation. Thus, if a taxable IG engaged in express advocacy or
electioneering communication, the IG would be subject to regulation.
Moreover, since the Service asserts that 527 status is not elective, but
applies to any organization that has as its primary purpose influencing
the election of a candidate for public office, even a taxable IG must be
192. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006).
193. 1 C.F.R. § 110.1(g) (2007).
194. The normative tax rules would be applied in a similar way if the IG
decided to organize as a corporation. In that case, the corporation, not the
shareholders, would be responsible for any tax liability generated by the
organization.
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careful to ensure that it is not primarily engaged in activities designed to
influence the election of one or more candidates.' 
95
The first question an entity needs to address is whether an entity
can organize as an LLC even if it lacks a profit motive. Generally,
partnerships, LLCs, and corporations are thought of as profit-making
entities, and partnerships are usually thought of as joint enterprises
entered into to make a profit.' 96 These entities can be formed, however,
without a profit motive.' A taxable LLC would, therefore, be a
potential vehicle for IGs seeking to create an entity that would not be
subject to either the tax regulations surrounding tax-exempt
organizations or the FEC regulations limiting the activities of
corporations.
The next question a taxable LLC must confront is the potential
income tax implications to the LLC. Assuming that two basic principles
of tax theory were applied-that payments in exchange for membership
interests are treated as contributions to capital and that contributions to
the LLC would be treated as gifts for income tax purposes-the
following scenario might work for an IG organized as a LLC.
A taxable LLC would be most advantageous when an IG was
being formed with several large donors and then expected to raise funds
from the populace at amounts mainly under the gift tax limit of $12,000
or when the IG anticipated that most of its contributions would be under
the gift tax limit. The large contributors could receive membership
interests in the LLC in return for their contributions. This would likely
mean that the contributions would be treated as contributions to the
capital of the LLC. These large contributors could receive voting
interests in the affairs of the LLC and could also receive capital interests
in the LLC upon liquidation. 198 Thus, major contributions to the LLC
195. Since the disclosure provisions in § 527 are premised on the fact that the
tax-exempt organization is receiving a benefit from tax-exempt status, it is unclear
whether § 527's disclosure provisions would be constitutional as applied to a taxable
entity.
196. See I.R.C. §§ 761, 7701 (West 2006).
197. For example, California law provides for the creation of non-profit LLCs.
Cal. Corp. Code § 17002 (West 2004).
198. The LLC would need to make sure that its memberships were not
considered securities under securities law. If the capital interest in the LLC made
the membership interest subject to security laws, then the LLC would likely not want
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would not be taxable to the IG because they could be treated as
contributions to capital.
There might, however, be consequences to the members of the
LLC. Since LLCs are treated as partnerships for tax purposes, the
members would have tax liability if the LLC had any income in a
particular year. They also could find themselves liable for debts of the
LLC if someone successfully pierced the corporate veil. Moreover, even
if a contribution is deemed a contribution to capital for income tax
purposes, the contribution may still be considered a gift for gift tax
purposes. The argument would be that although the contribution was a
contribution to capital and thus not income to the IG, the contributor still
did not receive money or money's worth for the payment. The IG would
have to successfully argue under Treasury Regulation 25.2512-8 that the
payment should be considered as for money's worth because it was a
bona fide transaction, made at arm's length, and free of donative
intent.199 Although, as I discuss in Part III(B)(2), it may be difficult for
the IG to argue that the donor received money or money's worth for a
payment, the argument is strengthened when the donor receives a
membership interest in or from the LLC. Under those circumstances, it
is easier for the donor to claim that he received money's worth for the
payment. In this context, the donor at least received something of value
and there may be an element of bargained-for exchange. Moreover,
since the IG is relying on the capital contribution theory and not the gift
theory as a means of excluding the contributions from income, the parties
may be able to meet the requirement in the Treasury Regulation that the
payment be at arm's length and free of donative intent. Assuming the
contributions to capital to the IG were not gifts subject to gift tax, the IG
could then receive large contributions with few tax ramifications. The
large contributions would not be income as contributions to capital, and
they would not be gifts because they would be deemed for money or
money's worth.
to provide for a capital interest. Moreover, it is possible that the major contributors
would be active participants and then their membership interests would not be
considered securities.
199. See infra Part III(B)(2) (discussing the argument that contributions to an
IG may not be subject to gift tax).
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The IG could then seek smaller contributions from individuals
under a gift theory. The IG would make it clear that it was only taking
those contributions if the donor believed that they were gifts to the
organization. The organization could make it clear that donations needed
to be made with detached and disinterested generosity and that the
contributor expected nothing in return from the donation. Although that
fact would not be definitive, it would indicate that the donor's intent
under Duberstein was for the contribution to be treated as a gift.
The only problem for the LLC would be for payments above
$12,000 that were not substantial enough for the LLC to issue
membership shares in exchange for the payments. In order for the
structure here to work the IG would have three choices: (1) the
contribution would have to be a gift and the donor would have to be
willing to pay gift tax or deduct the amount from his lifetime gift credit;
(2) they could issue membership interests at amounts just over $12,000
(assuming capital contributions were not subject to gift tax); or (3) they
could refuse donations over $12,000 but below some amount that entitled
someone to a membership interest.
The above structure would allow an IG to operate as a taxable
organization and still have very little, if any, tax liability. This structure
would only work if the contributions to capital were not treated as gifts
for gift tax purposes.
The second concern for IGs is that they have limited liability.
Although the law in the LLC context is not as settled as the law in the
corporate contexts, LLCs provide for limited liability.200 The members
of an LLC are not personally liable for the debts of the LLC. Thus if the
IG were sued for defamation, the individual members would not be liable
for any damages. They would, however, be subject to suit in their
personal capacity if they personally committed a tort.
The third concern facing many IGs is that they would prefer that
their contributors remain anonymous. Assuming the LLC operates its
affairs in a way that avoids regulation under the securities laws and
200. HUMPHREYS, supra note 1599, at § 2.02[2]d.
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avoids status as a political organization under § 527, a taxable LLC
201
would have no disclosure obligations.
Finally, the LLC would allow the IG to engage in
communication to the fullest extent. The LLC could be organized in
such a way as to avoid being treated as a corporation for purposes of
federal election law. An LLC has a choice of being treated as a
202partnership or a corporation for tax purposes. FEC regulations provide
that it will treat an LLC in the manner consistent with its tax status.2°3 So
if an LLC chooses to be taxed as a partnership, then the restrictions
placed on corporate communication will not apply to the LLC. Thus, an
LLC has the benefit of providing the IG with limited liability without the
consequences of the communication restrictions that are placed on
corporations.
CONCLUSION
As IGs seek out alternative organizational arrangements to
engage in political advocacy, the costs and benefits of forgoing tax-
exempt status and organizing as a taxable entity become paramount.
Some argue that tax-exempt status does not provide significant benefits
to IGs and that IGs would have little or no tax liability if they were
204
organized as taxable entities. My analysis here, however, produces a
different result. If normative tax principles are applied in a neutral
fashion, contributions to IGs will be treated as gifts. Thus the IG will
have no taxable income as a result of the contribution. Contributions to
the IG, however, will also be treated as gifts for purposes of the gift tax.
Thus, contributors to IGs who contribute more than $12,000 will bear a
significant additional financial obligation due to the donation. These
201. As previously discussed, if the LLC engaged in electioneering
communication or express advocacy, it would be subject to regulation under FECA
and would be subject to some disclosure obligations.
202. Since LLCs can choose to be taxed as partnerships, the LLC can avoid
being regulated as a corporation under election law by choosing to be taxed as a
partnership under the tax laws. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006).
203. FEC regulations provide that the organization's tax status will control its
status for election law purposes. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(g) (2007).
204. See supra note 60.
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additional costs will be passed on to the IGs and the IGs will bear the
financial ramification from the applicability of the gift tax.
There is the possibility as I discuss in Part IV that an LLC can
organize its affairs in a manner as to avoid significant tax liability. This
would require courts to accept a very favorable view of what constitutes
a gift for gift tax purposes, and, in the short term, would be very risky.
IGs can avoid this problem by accepting gifts only under the gift tax
limit (now $12,000), but this will hamper the IG's ability to raise funds.
Thus, the costs of forgoing tax-exempt status and choosing to organize as
a taxable LLC are high and are likely greater than the benefits.
Some may argue that this result makes no sense. IGs are not
generating a profit, and they have no income in the traditional sense. I
agree that the application of normative tax principles is not producing a
result that is consistent with good tax policy. Congress, however,
recognized this fact and created tax-exempt organizations from which
IGs can engage in political advocacy. In exchange for this preferential
treatment (or, one might say, correct treatment), Congress has put certain
regulatory requirements on tax-exempt organizations. If those
organizations seek out other organizational forms to achieve their ends,
then they should not complain when those forms create tax
consequences.
This article also highlights the problem with entity-based
campaign finance regulation. As Congress tries to regulate groups based
on the status of the entity, instead of the speech it engages in, IGs will
have greater incentives to seek out alternative entity structures. When
Congress is trying to protect the fisc and taxpayer subsidies, it makes
sense to engage in entity-based regulation, but when Congress is trying
to regulate speech, entity-based regulation merely encourages
organizations to seek out an alternative entity for their speech.
This article suggests that there would be significant
consequences to an IG that decided to forgo tax-exempt status, but it also
indicates that creative IGs can seek out different ways of organizing their
affairs to avoid entity based congressional regulation. Congress would
do better to regulate political advocacy by addressing the activities of the
IGs and not their entity status.
2007]
